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PROLBGOMBIA
In Act Two of T. S. Eliot's play, The Cocktail Party , one of the
stain characters, a young woman named Celia Copelstone, seeks the counsel
of a doctor who has been recommended to her by a friend. Sir Henry
Harcourt-Reilly is the doctor, whose role in the play is defined
primarily by what others expect of him. It is apparent that Celia comes
to Sir Henry because she is troubled, and the scene in his office is
typical of a patient seeking professional help from a psychotherapist.
The conversation between Celia and Sir Henry, however, is not
typical of the therapist*s consulting room. Being invited to describe
her present state of mind, Celia begins,
Well, there are two things I can*t understand,
Which you might consider symptoms. But first I must tell you
That I should really like to think there fs something wrong with me~
Because if there isn 9t, then there's something wrong,
Or at least, very different from what it seemed to be,
With the world itself—and that's much more frightening!
That would be terrible. So I'd rather believe
There is something wrong with me, that could be put right.
I'd do anything you told me, to get back to normality.
Sir Henry comments that they must find out more about her before
normality can be defined, and asks her to describe her first symptom.
Celia speaks of what she calls "an awareness of solitude." She ex-
plains that she means not simply being by herself, and refers to her
discovery that "one is always along." She continues,
. . . .everyone's alone—or so it seems to me.
They make noises, and think they are talking to each other;
nP, S. Eliot, The Cocktail Party (The Complete Poems and Plays .
New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952), p. 359
They make faces, and think they understand each other.
And I fra sure that they don't. It that a delusion?2
Sir Henry postpones his answer, and bids Celia to describe her
other symptom. She says,
That"s stranger still
It sounds ridiculous—but the only word for it
That I can find, is a sense of sin. 3
Again she wonders if this makes her "abnornal," and once more Sir
Henry reninds her that they have yet to determine what is normal for
her. He asks what she means by a sense of sin.
Celia states that she doesn"t mean "sin in the ordinary sense,"
which is "being immoral." She adds that she has "never noticed that
immorality was accompanied by a sense of sin."4
Then, talking of her "conventional" upbringing, Celia says,
I had always been taught to disbelieve in sin.
Oh, I don*t mean that it was ever mentioned?
But anything wrong, from our point of view
Was either bad form, or was psychological.
And bad form always led to disaster
Because the people one knew disapproved of it.
I don#t worry ouch about form myself—
But when everything^ bad form, or mental kinks,
You either become bad form, and cease to care,
Or else, if you care, you must be kinky. 5
Trying to explain what she means by her suspected psychological
"kink," Celia concludes her description of her sense of sin, saying,
It fs not the feeling of anything I*ve ever done
,
Which I might get away from, or of anything in me
I could get rid of—but of emptiness, of failure
Towards someone, or something, outside myself;
And I feel I must . . . atone—is that the word?
Can you treat a patient for such a state of mind?
6
^bid.
,
p. 360. ^bid. 4Ibid. . p. 361. 5lbJUL
6Ibid., p. 362.
Sir Henry opines that Celia's condition is curable, but she
oust choose her own treatment. He proceeds, then, to outline the
choice she oust make. If she wishes, he can help to reconcile her
to the "human condition," which he suggests is seen in the conven-
tional kind of life she already knows, in which people
Maintain themselves by the common routine,
Learn to avoid excessive expectation,
Become tolerant of themselves and others,
Giving and taking in the usual actions
What there is to give and take. They do not repine;
Are contented with . . . casual talk before the fire
Two people who know they do not understand each other,
Breeding children whom they do not understand
And who will never understand them. 7
But Celia, referring to a vision of something more in life,
rejects this form of "treatment," which seems to her a "betrayal"
of her vision. So Sir Henry outlines the other choice open to her:
There _is another way, if you have the courage.
The first I could describe in familiar terms
Because you have seen it, as we all have seen it,
Illustrated, more or less, in the lives of those about us.
The second is unknown, and so requires faith—
The kind of faith that issues from despair.
The destination cannot be described;
You will know very little until you get there;
You will journey blind. But the way leads towards possession
Of what you have sought for in the wrong place.*5
Intrigued by this description of the "second way," Celia inquires
further about it. She is told that either way means "loneliness—and
communion." What should she do, she asks. Sir Henry reminds her again
that it is her choice, and she, finding it unthinkable that she return
to "everyday life," chooses the second way. With her "treatment" yet
7Ibid
. , pp. 363-4. Sibid ., pp. 364-5.
to be worked out in detail, she leaves the doctor's office as he says
to her, *KJo in Peace, ray daughter. Atork out your salvation with
diligence." 9
The final scene of the play, like the opening scene, is a cocktail
party, which takes place two years after the scene in Sir Henry"3
office. Celia is not there, and an inquiry into her whereabouts
reveals the outcorae of her "treatment." She has joined a nursing
order of nuns, and lost her life in an insurrection of heathen natives
on a little known distant island. "It*s the waste that I resent,"
consents one of the guests upon hearing of Celia*s death. Sir Henry
responds by suggesting that it was not a waste—that Celia freely
chose her way of life, and freely risked death. "And if that is not
a happy death, \dxat death is happy?" he concludes. 10 The guests at
the party, and the audience, are left to answer this question.
9Ibid., p. 366. 10Ibid. , p. 384.
CHAPTER I
INTODDOCnOM
A scene from a piny by T# S, Eliot serves to raise sane questions
about the nature of man that will be dealt with in this paper. The
questions are of particular relevance to members of the helping pro-
fessions, especially psychotherapists and counselors. Eliot* s drama
also exemplifies the context of Christian faith and thought, within
which this discussion is placed.
I. TUB PROBLEM
Certain general questions regarding the nature of man would seem
to need to be faced by practicing counselors and therapists. The
questions as presented here form the main divisions of this paper,
they are: (1) How may we understand the human predicament, as
illustrated by the sense of sin which Celia faces in the play? (2)
How may the basic assumptions about man's predicament be spelled out
in psychological terms? And (3) what is the meaning of the concepts
of healing and health?
The Context of the Discussion
The question of human nature is not something that can be discussed
in a vacuum. One*s view of man is a part of, or is directly related to,
one fs most fundamental assumptions about life, i.e., one's philosophy
or religious beliefs. It is, therefore, appropriate at the beginning
of this paper to state that the author 's point of view, like that of
T. S. El±ot 9s, is avowedly Christian, Hence, a scene froo The Cocktail
Party was deened useful in providing a starting point for this discussion
of the nature of nan in a Christian context. It nay be noted that the
materials chosen for consideration in this paper, the language used,
even the wording of the opening questions, have been determined, in
large measure, by the Christian bias of the present writer.
This is not to suggest, however, that there is but one way of
describing the human condition, even in Christian terms. The writer fs
prejudices and predilections may find him disagreeing with others who
are equally intent upon writing from a Christian point of view. The
writer, for instance, draws heavily upon the theology of Paul Tillich,
who may speak for some Christians, but certainly not all of them.
Disagreement with the writerfs views by both Christians and non-Chris-
tians is thus to be anticipated, and is regarded, not as an obstacle,
but as a stimulus to further debate and research in a continuing quest
for truth.
The Purpose of the Study
One of the aims of this paper is to present to counselors and
psychologists a Christian view of man as a viable option—as one way
of understanding the human condition, and of defining the concepts of
healing and health. But the questions raised here are hardly peculiar
to Christians. Any person practicing one of the healing professions
will hold implicit or explicit assumptions regarding the nature of nan
and his predicament, the meaning of health, and the work of the healer.
The extent to which onc*s basic assumptions are explicit and
actually operative seems to vary from person to person. And the
extent to which those engaged in healing are required, in the course of
their training and practice, to examine their basic assumptions also
seems to vary. Hence, the second purpose of this study is to invite
counselors and psychologists to think through their basic assunptions
about the nature of nan, and to test those assumptions in their practice
as professional healers.
The Importance of the Problem
The question of the healer 9s concepts of human nature is not an
idle intellectual game. As Rollo May has expressed it, "the psycho-
logist must continually analyze and clarify his own presuppositions."1
Speaking of psychologists who serve as therapists and counselors, May
continues,
...the one way we can keep the presuppositions underlying our
particular nethod from undue biasing effect is to know consciously
what they are and so not absolutize or dogmatize them. Ihus we
have at least a chance of refraining from forcing our subjects
or patients upon our *procrustean couches* and lopping off, or
refusing to see, what does not fit.**
May makes it clear that he is not referring merely to the psycho-
logical school or the methodology the counselor may adhere to. He is
concerned, rather, with the "transcendental conceptions," that is, the
"underlying presuppositions which determine the goals of one*s activity."3
May refers, in other words, to the beliefs and values of those who use
psychology in the service of helping or healing others.
Tlollo May (ed.) , gxistential Psychology (New York: Random House,
1961), p. 30.
%bid. 3Ibid.
, p. 33.
May's concern for the psychologist's underlying presuppositions is
reiterated in a later book, in which he states,
The critical battles between approaches to psychology and
psychoanalysis in our culture in the next decades, I propose,
will be on the battleground of the inage of man—-that is to
say, on the conceptions of man which underlie empirical
research.**
If, as Way suggests, it is one's "transcendental conceptions'*
which "determine the goals of one's activity," and "underlie empirical
research," the radical importance of the psychologists image of nan
seems beyond question. It is what the therapist assumes about nan
that shapes his understanding of his client's problems and defines
the objectives of the counseling process. And those same assumptions
determine what the psychologist, as a scientist, deems as needed areas
of research, and inform his interpretations of the resulting data.
Scientific research and clinical practice nay alter the psycholo-
gist's presuppositions, of course. Indeed, it would be surprising if
they didn't, when new evidence warrants such a change. But it seems
safe to say that, as a rule, one's basic belief system is not readily
discarded or fundamentally disrupted. For it is what one assumes as
true that gives meaning and coherence to his knowledge and activities,
lb paraphrase St. Augustine, one believes in order that one may then
understand, and this seems to be true, regardless of what is actually
believed.
Because they are regarded as scientists, psychologists may be
more likely to be listened to these days than theologians. Trained
4Rollo May, Psychology and the Human Dilemma (Princeton, N. J.:
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967)
,
p. 90.
9counselors, present in increasing nunbers in American schools and
colleges, may hear more "confessions" than pastors. Some church
people and others nay be upset by these trends, but their fears seem
to be misplaced. The advent of therapists and counselors does not
necessarily indicate a movement away from familiar views of nan
expressed in traditional religious terms. It means, rather, that
such beliefs are now operating in different places, such as the
psychological laboratory and the counselor *s office. The real
question is: what kind of belief system—which image of man--under-
lies the present work of the psychologist and counselor?
In an era of burgeoning technology, mass media of communication,
and rapid population growth, when people must often pay to have
someone listen to them, it seems certain that one of the critical
issues of the day is the question of man. Is man made in the image
of the machine, to be programmed for the sake of the economy or
the state, and discarded when no longer useful? Or is man created
a little lower than the angels, capable of some measure of self-
determination, and not meant to be used as an object? Between these
divergent positions there are various views of man, one of which is
the focal point of this paper. For the way in which man deals with
the past, lives in the present, and faces the future is shaped in no
small measure by his conception of himself.
II. THE LANGUAGE OF THE DISCUSSION
The Philosophical Background
It is not possible to speak of "human nature" without recourse to
10
the terminology of philosophy. For instance, the word, nature, as
just used, is a metaphysical tern defined by abstracting certain
hunan qualities that men are assumed to have in canon. Or, again,
a definition of "health" entails assumptions that may be called
ontological, for they have to do with raan fs being .
A number of philosophical terms are used in this paper, and
hopefully they will be defined sufficiently by the context in which
they appear. For in a sense, the entire ensuing discussion is an
examination of metaphysical and ontological terms, and of the under-
lying assumptions which give them meaning. The writer's intent is
to suggest some possible meanings that are derived from a Christian
view of man. And this is done to open up the discussion, not in the
pretense of giving final answers.
The actual spelling out of a Christian doctrine of man is the
task of theology, which, like philosophy, calls for the use of meta-
physical and ontological terms. The theologian may choose from among
a number of philosophical vocabularies to state his position. In
this report, the theological framework is supplied primarily by the
works of Paul Tillich, who relies heavily on the words and thought
forms of modern existentialism. Tillich*s existentialist leanings
have given some new insights into the ancient faith of the Church.
In addition, the language of existentialism which Tillich speaks is
also used by a number of present day psychologists. Vfliile all
existentialists do not agree with each other, their common concerns
and frame of reference provide a means of comparing and contrasting
some of the different views of nan that are now being debated.
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"Existential!m9m writes Tillich, Mis an analysis of the human
predicament."^ It is this focus upon the human condition that maizes
existentialism relevant to the theme of this report. The existentialist
views of Tillich and of Rollo May in particular will be presented in
some detail in the next three chapters.
Some Specific Terms to Be Defined
Any philosopher or theologian needs to define the term > that are
important to him. The problems entailed in making these definitions
often center around the fact that a given word has a history of its
own, and may carry many connotations derived from its previous ua|t.
A careful philosophical definition, then, may require a lengthy expo-
sition that will be an attempt to say both viiat a given word ncans
and what it doesn't mean. The alternative is to present a new word
v.hich nay then be given a specific and particular definition.
This study does not offer any new words, or seek to redefine any
old ones. However, a few of the key terms are considered at some
length in the course of the discussion. The word, sin , for instance,
is first used in the Prolegomena, and its significance is the nain
theme of Chapters II and III. Chapter IV is concerned with the defi-
nition of healing and health
,
in both a theological and psychological
context. Since these terms are dealt with so extensively in the body
of the paper, no preliminary discussion of them is necessary.
The human predicament is a tern already introduced in this chapter.
Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1957) II, 26.
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Broadly speaking, it is a synonym for the human condition, which T. S.
Bliot employs in The Cocktail Party , and which refers simply to the
state of being human
The word, predicament, is meant to imply, however, the ambiguities
of human life. In theBiblical tradition, man's predicament is suggested
in the creation story in Genesis, which reports that man is a creature
of the dust, but is made in the image of God. Tillich suggests that
the predicament is related to the contrasting conditions of human
destiny and freedom. Rollo May, who writes of the human "dileru a,"
thinks of man's predicament in terms of knowing oneself as both subject
and object at the same time. These complementary views of man's con-
dition will be explored further in the discussion that follows.
2* $.• Bliot and the Terminology of Psychiatry
The way in which T. s. Eliot deals with the human condition in
The Cocktail Party is important to this study, because of the language
he uses in order to get his message across. Celia's predicament is
presented in terms of her "illness. " She describes her "symptoms,"
and presents herself for "treatment," to a "doctor" who regards her as
one of his "patients." In this way, Bliot accepts the familiar medical
model of human psychic problems. The doctor-psychiatrist is portrayed
as a powerful person, who makes a diagnosis, and then dispenses his
prescriptions for treatment. The patient is seen as relatively help-
less, and dependent upon the uocvor's healing ministrations. In The
Cocktail Party , Celia is presented as a patient who has come to Sir
Henry's consulting room in the hope that he will make her whole.
13
Yet Celiacs symptoms do not turn out to be ones that are associated
with any disease in the usual sense. Celia and Sir Henry seem to speak
about life in general, as it may come to anyone. Celiacs symptons
refer to the condition of being human, as she has experienced this.
And the treatment is not something that is done jfco Celia, but has to
do with the way she accepts the human condition and tries to live with
it.
Writing for a 20th century audience, Eliot uses terms that will be
well known to his listeners, in an effort to convey something about life
in a universal way. But the net effect of The Cocktail Party is to
point out that the terminology of medical practice is inadequate to
deal with the human condition. Indeed, the difficulties presented by
such medical terras as "illness" and "health," especially in a psycholo-
gical context, have been amply illustrated in recent years.
It may be, as Maslow suggests, that the notion of "mental health"
as a psychological concept cannot yet be discarded.7 But if the
psychologist is to be concerned with the full depth and breadth of
human experience, he will require some basic assumptions about man
that will make popular notions of mental health quite unsatisfactory.
Hence, one of the objectives of this report is to offer alternatives
to the medical model as a way of coming to terms with the human predica-
ment.
B.g., see Thomas Szasz, "The Myth of Mental Illness," American
Psychologist
. 1960, 15, 113-118; Marie Johoda, Current Concepts of
Positive Mental Health (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1958); or Abraham
Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (Princeton, N. J.; D. Van Nostrand
Company, Inc., 1962.)
'Maslow, og. clt
. , p. iii
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III . THE NATURE OF THE ASSUMPTIONS
A Christian view of nan is derived from presuppositions that are
admittedly of a religious nature. The presuppositions are matters of
faith and belief; they are assumptions , not indisputable facts, and as
such, are not subject to any absolute proof.
It may be debated whether there are any facts beyond dispute. Even
science, states Carl Rogers, produces "only tentative beliefs, existing
subjectively, in a number of different persons. If these beliefs are
not tentative, then what exists is dogma, not science.
"
8
To be sure, careful use of the scientific method enables people
to hold many beliefs with a high degree of certainty. Moreover, states
Rogers, science is the best means available for checking the "subject."9
But science does not produce the hunches or the hypotheses; its function,
rather, is to serve as a means of verifying, refining, altering, or
rejecting the feelings, assumptions, and beliefs that already exist in
the thought of the scientist.
The assumptions and preconceptions discussed in this paper, then,
are what may be called "pre-scientific." They are based on the inter-
pretation of limited knowledge, and have grown out of the viewpoints
and beliefs of the men who hold such assumptions. It is the "concep-
tions of man which underlie empirical research" that are the focal
point of this duscussion. The need for a great deal more research
in the best scientific tradition is to be taken for granted, when it
Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1961), p. "219. ~
°Ibid., p. 218.
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comes to the question of man.
Regardless of the specific content of the scientists preconcep-
tions of the nature of nan, the presuppositions may logically be
called "religious." This is merely to regard religion in a generic
sense as that which constitutes any set of basic assumptions about life,
whether or not there is an institutional expression of those beliefs.
Christian preconceptions of man may thus be deemed comparable to other
views of man, in that each statement of the nature of man rests upon
the same kind of basic assumptions. Likewise, whatever the assumptions,
they may lead to the formation of testable hypotheses that are the
necessary prelude to scientific research.
A primary task of scientist and healer alike is to be aware, as
far as possible, of the transcendental conceptions that give meaning
and purpose to his work. Dogma is to be eschewed in favor of an open-
mindedness that is better able to serve both the advancement of learning,
and the understanding of those who seek to be healed. Still, it is the
fundamental assumptions that are the alpha and omega of the psychologist
and therapist, as they seek to organize their knowledge, develop their
methods, and define their goals. The consideration of some preconcep-
tions about the nature of man from a Christian point of view begins in
the following chapter.
CHAPTER II
SIN AND THE HINAN PREDICAMENT
Sin is a familiar word that refers to the hunan predicament as it
is understood in the context of a particular religious faith. The
significance of sin will be discussed initially in terns of what it
does and does not nean to T. S. Eliot. Following a brief look at what
sin may signify in an existentialist frame of thought, sin and its
existentialist synonym, estrangement, will be explored in its various
theological dimensions, as suggested by the theology of Paul Tillich,
I . THE MEANING OF SIN
Celia Copiestone describes one of her "symptoms" to Sir Henry
Harcourt-Reilly, and claims to be suffering from a sense of sin. The
word, sin, seems somehow out of place in the consulting room of a
psychiatrist. For though sin is not an unfamiliar term to most people
in this culture, it seems unlikely that it would be discussed by a
"patient" in the context of mental illness. After all, of what disease
is Celiacs sense of sin a symptom?
Sin is a theological term that belongs to and is defined by the
Biblical tradition connon to both Christians and Jews. It is mentioned,
alluded to, and otherwise taken for granted in the Scriptures, and is
an integral part of the Church ts teachings. The Christian doctrine of
Original Sin expresses the belief that all men are affected by sin. How
man may deal with sin is tied in with the Christian concepts of atonemen*
17
and salvation, and is expressed in the corporate and sacramental life
of the Church. 1
It is not within the scope of this discussion, however, to
present a history of the concept of sin and all its varied meanings,
the focus here is upon the existential significance of sin, which is
regarded as one way of understanding the human predicament
.
It is interesting to speculate on the reaction of counselors and
others to the word, sin, if it should be heard in their "consulting
rooms" in real life. Presumably, the counselor would try to determine
what sin may mean to his client, whether or not the counselor himself
"believed" in sin.
If, in fact, the topic of sin seems out of place in the consulting
room, one might wonder, as well, about the more ordinary language of
the counseling interview. Clients often use psychological terms to
describe their life situation, and the counselor may take these words
for granted. But again, the counselor must try to determine what the
client *s terms mean to him. If "sin" suffers because it is a foreign
word to the counselor, so may psychological terms suffer if they are
taken for granted by the counselor.
The pastoral counselor may face the same problem in reverse. As
any pastor knows, sin has a variety of meanings, including that which
is peculiar to the individual counselee, which the pastor should try
T?or a general discussion of sin and its synonyms-—trespass
,
iniquity, et al, see, Alan Richardson (ed.), A Theological l.'ord Book
°* the Bible (London: SCM Press Ltd. , 1957) for The Oxford Dictionary
o? the Christian Church (London: Osford University Press, 19^8)
.
to discover, if his parishioner uses the viord.
The actual setting of the "consulting room" may tend to determine
the clients choice of words. Obviously the counselor mist try to
hear what his client is saying, both through
, and in spite of, the
language he uses.
1' 1 • Bliofs View of Sin
Ivhat does sin nean to Celia Coplestone? Celia begins by saying
that she does not refer to "sin in the ordinary sense," which, she
2
supposes, is "being ixwioral. She adds that she has "never noticed
that immorality was accompanied by a sense of sin." And she wonders
if the people who are called immoral aren't rather those "who we say
have no moral sense."
In so stating what she doesn*t nean by sin, Celia suggests that
sin is not simply being bad—that it is not just breaking the rules
supplied by conventional morality. Undoubtedly the playwright is not
satisfied with the well known teaching, often promulgated by the Church,
that sin is defined by a series of "thou salt not's," and that sinners
are those who either ignore or break the laws. Indeed, if such a notion
of sin prevails, the Church is not being true to its larger concept of
the human predicament, which sin describes.
The "3in equals immorality" idea is misleading on two counts. First,
it implies that overcoming sin is simply a question of trying harder not
to be immoral. Overcoming sin is reduced to a question of striving for
and achieving moral perfection—a matter of laiowing the moral law and
TBliot, og. cit
. , p. 361.
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keeping it. It was for promoting this kind of religion that Jesus
denounced the rharisees. And it is this view that Celia rejects as
she tries to describe her sense of sin to Sir Henry.
Secondly, the concept of sin as immorality fails to account for
the radical nature of nan's humanness. Celia speaks of this as she
says how she actually feels about herself. She has experienced a
sense of being alone—not just being by herself, but a realization
that "one is always alone."3 She realized her aloneness when she found
that what she thought was a loving relationship between herself and a
married man turned out to be a case of two "strangers" using each
other for their own purposes. And she asks, "Are we all in fact
unloving and unlovable? Then one is alone . . ."
Celia talks on about what sin means to her. She doesn't understand
why she feels "sinful," and adds,
It must be some kind of hallucination;
Yet at the same time, I'm frightened by the fear
That it is more real than anything I believe in.
It's not the feeling of anything I've ever done
,
Which I might get away from, or of anything in me
I could get rid of—but of emptiness, of failure
Towards someone, or something, outside of myself:
And I feel I must . . . atone—is that the word?'
Penally, Celia speaks of the "inconsolable memory" of something she
has caught a glimpse of in her relationships with others. She refers to
her vision of a kind of ecstatic and selfless "loving in the spirit,"
which is something she longs for, but has yet to find. Can it be found,
she asks. And if it can't, she wonders, "VJhy do I feel guilty at not
^bid.
,
p. 360. 4Ibid.
,
p. 362. ^tbid.
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having found it?*6
In sun, Celia fs sense of sin is associated with feelings of
lonlincss and of fear, a sense of emptiness and failure, the need to
atone, and the awareness of guilt—not guilt from being immoral as
such, but guilt resulting from the realization of having failed, sorae-
how, to fulfill her vision of life. And she wonders what is wrong
with her, and whether she can be "cured."
Sin as an Oncological Word
T. S. Eliot does not write, of course, as a theologian, but as a
playwright putting words into the mouths of his characters. Yet the
lines which Celia speaks offer an implicit theology of sin in her
description of what may be called her predicament. Celia makes it
clear that her sense of sin is not based on something she has done
,
but on her awareness of who she is, as a human being. It is in this
light that sin may be seen as basically an ontological term, rather
than as primarily a moral or ethical one. Sin has to do with the con-
dition of man*s being, as he stands before God, before others, and
himself. Though Celia never refers to God directly, her sense of
sin—-her feeling of "failure towards someone, or something, outside
of" herself—seems obviously to imply that sin describes the subjective
awareness of how Celia is related to all that is—herself, others, and
God—the very ground of her being.
In emphasizing the ontological dimensions of sin, T. S. Eliot gives
Celia some additional lines that suggest why sin may have lost some of
6Ibid., p. 363.
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its original meaning. She states,
Well, my upbringing was pretty conventional—
I had always been taught to disbelieve in sin.
Oh, I don't nean that it was ever mentioned!
But anything wrong, from our point of view,
was either bad form, or was psychological.
'
Being taught to "disbelieve in sin" does, indeed, seem "pretty
conventional" in the present era. Although the philosophy of inevi-
table progress does not seem to prevail in the Western world as it
once might have, there remain in Western thought elements of an idealism
that still looks for the ultimate "triumph" of empirical science, and
the perfectibility of man. The adherents of these views would hardly
take sin seriously in its ontological sense, and hence, not in its
moral sense, either. Sin is not believed in by those who deny that
there is a fundamental human predicament.
Celiaf s "conventional" upbringing taught her the "anything wrong"
was to be explained as either "bad form" or as "psychological." Bad
form suggests, primarily, ignorance—of facts, customs, or of manners,
perhaps. Ihe implication is that bad form is correctable, or, at its
worst, unavoidable, but that it is not a cause Sot any profound concern
over man's predicament.
Undoubtedly it is the more serious human troubles that are ,*psycho-
logical." Such difficulties, harder to account for than bad form, are
usually attributed to an adverse environment, or to what is called
maladjustment, which two factors may represent the poles of a continuum
on which psychological wrongs are placed. Popular thought holds that
7Ibid.
, p. 361
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if the environment can be improved, or if the individual can be re-
adjusted to his surroundings, psychological problems can be ultimately
resolved. The optimism underlying this view of i,\an is apparent. There
is no real predicament for nan, it is said; there are nerely psycholo-
gical difficulties to be faced, and hopefully, overcome. Nor does this
viewpoint acknowledge any basic moral dilemma, for nan is not respon-
sible for his troubles if they are psychological.
It would seem that sin has no meaning for those who believe in
what Celia calls "bad form" or "psychological". Sin loses both its
ontological and moral significance for the person whose basic assump-
tions suggest that such things as ignorance, environmental influences,
and maladjustment constitute the worst of the human condition. Celia
speaks for riany when she says that she was taught not to believe in sin.
For sin is something that must be believed in, as part of one #s transcen-
dental concepts, or else it may be rightly ignored in favor of a diffe-
rent view of man.
Yet Celia finds herself rejecting her former beliefs in bad form
and things psychological, for these concepts are no longer adequate
to account for her experience. She suspects that there is something
radically wrong with the world, and with herself—something for which
she feels partly responsible. She is not sure whether she can be cured,
The question of responsibility is now being fought out, for
instance, in the courts of lav/, wherein those accused of crimes may
be judged innocent if a plea of insanity is upheld. But if, in fact,
a defendent is guilty, though "insane," it is still a question of
how the defendent 9s responsibility to himself and society may be
discharged. The complexities of this issue go far beyong its legal
implications.
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and pleads for help as she wrestles with what she insists upon calling
her sense of sin.
II . AN HXISTHNTIALIST VIEW OP SIN
As she discusses her sense of sin, Celia speaks in existential
terns—the terns that cone out of her own experiences. That is, she
does not quote a textbook definition of sin, but cites what is happen-
ing to her , as she talks of sin. She seems to choose the tern, sense
of sin, to label the sun total of her reactions to, and her awareness
of, who she is and what she lias been through.
Celia's description of her predicament may be called an existen-
tial one, because of her subjective involvenent in what she is saying
about herself. As Paul Tillich has stated, 'The opposite of existential,
is detached,*' and this hardly describes Celia, as she alludes to what
her life looks and feels like in personal terns.
Tillich*s illustration of the meaning of "existential" is clarified
further as he explains,
In existential thinking, the object is involved. In non-
existential thinking, the object is detached. By its very
nature, theology i3 existential; by its very nature, science
is non-existential. Philosophy unites elements of both.
Existentialism is not so much a philosophical school as it is an
attitude toward life. Existentialists agree in tailing the human pre-
dicament seriously. ..here they may disagree among themselves is in
the approach they take to the questions which the human condition raises.
That is, the existentialist may find his "answers" in the assumptions
9TIllich, oo. cit.
, p. 26«
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and belief systems of atheism, or humanism, or of a particular religious
tradition. Ihus, for example, T. 5. Eliot nay be called a Christian
existentialist, in that he presents Celiacs predicament as real for her,
and offers for her a Christian solution. .And speaking as a theologian,
TiUich acknowledges his debt to poets , novelists, artists, psychologists,
and others, for providing an existential understanding of the hunan
predicament.
For the Christian, T. S. Eliot's play is a fruitful starting point
for consideration of the hunan predicament , because Eliot takes the
huaan condition seriously, and presents it in terns of a faniliar
Biblical concept—sin. As Tiilich has pointed out, if words such as
"sin" and"judgment" have become meaningless, they
have lost not their truth but rather an expressive
which can be regained only if they are filled with the
insights into huaan nature which existentialism (including
depth psychology) has given to us. 10
Certainly Ihe Cocktail Party succeeds in restoring sone of the profundity
of neaning that rightly belongs to the notion of sin.
Sin and Estrangement
Existentialists have offered various synonyms for what Celia calls
her sense of sin. Estrangement is one of the most provocative of these—
a tern first used in a philosophical context by Hegel. ** But Hegel*
s
notion that nan's estrangement is overcome by reconciliation in history
has been unanimously rejected by existentialists. They have insisted
that existence is estrangement, and estrangenent points to the primary
^Ibid
. ,
p. 28. -"sec Tiilich, op. cit. , pp. 23-25.
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fact of nan^s predicament.
Using this tern in the context of Christian theology, Tillich
discusses the meaning of estrangement at great length in Part III of
his Systematic Theology . He sees the concept of estrangement as most
helpful in understanding the human predicament. He states,
Man as he exists is not what he essentially is and ought to
be. He is estranged from his true being. The profundity of
the term •estrangement 9 lies in the implication that one belongs
essentially to that from which one is estranged. Man is not a
stranger to his true being, for he belongs to it. He is judged
by it but cannot be completely separated, even if he is hostile
to it. Man's hostility to God proves indisputably that he
belongs to him. Where there is the possibility of hate, there
and there alone is the possibility of love.
Though estrangement is not a Biblical term, Tillich believes
that it is implied in the Biblical descriptions of man's predicament:
in raan*s expulsion from paradise, in the hostility between man and
nature, man and man, nation and nation. Sin may be understood as
"the state of estrangement;" the concept of original sin points to
the universal character of estrangement. 13 Tillich notes, however,
that while estrangement implies an unchangeable and unavoidable "element
of destiny" in man's predicament, sin preserves the "element of personal
responsibility in one*s estrangement."14
Tillich sums up the intcr-relatedness of these terms as follows:
Man*s predicament is estrangement, but his estrangement is
sin. It is not a state of things, like the laws of nature,
but a matter of both personal freedom and universal destiny.
It is not disobedience to a law which makes an act sinful,
but the fact that it is an expression of man's estrangement
from God, from men, from himself."15
1%bid., p. 45. 13Ibid . , p. 46. ^Ibid . ^Ibid . , pp. 46-47.
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III. THBOLCGICAL DmaiSIONS OP ESTRANGfrlENT
Unbelief . Tillich discusses various facets of estrangement that
are related to the Christian concept of sin, and which anplify the
nature of nan fs predicament. Pirst is unbelief, a familiar synonym
for sin, which points to can's deliberate turning away fron the ground
of his being (God) , and which Tillich calls the "first mark of estrange-
ment."10 FurUier, "un-faith is ultimately identical with un-love."
Unbelief and unlove imply that sin is a matter of nan's relationship
to God, fron Whon nen are estranged, but with VJhora reunion is possible
through that which can overcome estrangement, viz. , faith and love
(agape).
Hubris . Sin and estrangement are also seen in **self-elevation,"
which is Tillichfs translation of the Greek hubris . (Pride is deemed
an inadequate word for hubris
.
) Hubris is the other side of unbelief,
and indicates man*s efforts to put himself at the center of his world.
**It« main symptom," writes Tillich, "is that man does not acknowledge
his find-rude.**17 Hubris may be seen in history whenever men think
their partial truths are the whole truth, or identify their limited
goodness with absolute goodness (as the Pharisees and their successors
have done), or whenever men make idols out of their own creations.
Hubris is man playing God, which man does individually but which may
be expressed institutionally. Remarks Tillich, "No one is willing to
acknowledge, in concrete terms, his finitude, his weakness and his
errors, his ignorance and insecurity, his loneliness and anxiety.**18
16Ibid.
, p. 48.
17Ibid.
, p. 51.
18Ibid.
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The expressions of sin as hubris are undoubtedly well known, and are
especially familiar to those in the healing professions.
Concupiscence . Finally, Tillich speaks of estrangement as con-
cupiscence, which is the desire of nan to deal with his estrangement
by trying to draw all of reality into hinself , to be reunited with
the whole from which he is separated. Concupiscence refers to physical
hunger, sex, knowledge, power, wealth, and spiritual values—all of the
things that men strive for and lust after.
In an extended exposition of concupiscence, Tillich freely draws
upon the insights provided by existentialist elements in literature,
philosophy, and psychology. He refers to Kierkegaard fs analyses of
the Baperor Nero and Don Juan, and to Goethe *s Faust, as examples of
personages consumed by concupiscence—the unlimited desire to control,
to possess, or to know everything. Tillich suggests that Nietzsche*s
"will to power" and Freud fs "libido" point to "expressions of con-
cupiscence and estrangement." And he adds that these concepts of
Nietzsche*s and Freudfs "have contributed immensely to a rediscovery
of the Christian view of man fs predicament."19
the Universality of Estrangement
So far in this discussion, sin has been presented primarily as it
is felt and expressed within individuals, all of whom share the human
predicament and live in estrangement from the ground of their being.
But the universal dimension of estrangement must also be acknowledged
in Christian theology, as Tillich reminds his readers. That is, all
' Ibid., p. 53
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of creation is estranged, and as a created being, the individual person
cannot avoid the influences of his social and physical environment,
which limit nan's freedom, and share with him his destiny as finite
being. 20 As Tillich puts it, "Biological, psychological and socio-
logical powers are effective in every individual decision* The universe
works through us as part of the universe."2*
Illustrating this point, Tillich states that estrangement
has been explained in deterministic terns: physically, by
a mechanistic determinism; biologically, by theories of the
decadence of the biological power of life; psychologically,
as the compulsory force of the unconscious; sociologically,
as the result of class domination; culturally, as the lack of
educational adjustment. None of these explanations accounts
for the feeling of personal responsibility that man has for
his acts in the state of estrangement. But each of these
theories contributes to an understanding of the element of
destiny in the human predicament. 22
Returning once more to Celia Coplestone, it may be noted that
she refers to her awareness of the fact that the world shares in
her predicament. She tells Sir Henry,
... I should really like to think there's something wrong
with me—
Because, if there isn't, then there's something wrong,
Or at least, very different from what it seemed to be,
With the world itself—and that's much more frightening!
That would be terrible. . . . 23
It is "frightening" and
"terrible" to realize that something is wrong with the world—something
^Classical €2iristian theology thus speaks of the Pall of nature
as well as the Pall of man.
21Tillich, op., cit., p. 42.
22
Ibid
. , pp. 56-7
23Bliot, oj>. cit., P. 359
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which Celia can do nothing about. "So I'd rather believe," concludes
Celia, "there is something wrong with me, that could be put right."
She then proceeds to focus upon doing something about herself, rather
than attacking the world over which she has little or no control. The
Christian would add that only as one cones to terns with his own
estrangenent can he "overcome the world."
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Existentialists in general acknowledge what is called the human
predicament. This concept refers to the condition of man in his fini-
tude, his creatureliness , his contingency. The religious tern, sin,
takes into account nan*s predicament, and his partial responsibility
for it as a creature who nay exercise his freedom even in the face of
the elements of destiny. Man is estranged—not separated—from his
essential being, which Christians call the image of God in which nan
is created.
The universality of estrangement is seen in the forces which condi-
tion nan's freedom. Yet man is never totally determined by the so-
called elements of destiny, for man alone of all creatures knows that
he has a predicament which he nay accept as his own, and which he nay
respond to as one who is responsible. It is the awareness of personal
responsibility for her own predicament that enables a person such as
Celia Coplestone to speak of her sense of sin.
^St. Paul speaks of sin itself as one of the determining factors
in life: "But if what I would not, that I do, it is no more I that do
it, but sin which dwelleth in me." See Romans 7:13-23.
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Like other transcendental concepts, sin may not be directly proven
or demonstrated. Celia ightly suggests that one is free to believe or
to disbelieve in sin. But for the Christian, sin is an indispensible
tern, for while it refers to cam's predicament , it anticipates also
the resolution of that predicament. 'The language about sin is for the
Christian a language concerning a problem solved," theologian Paul Van
Buren has written. 25 This is the language of faith for those who see
Jesus the Christ as the One Vlho overcomes man fs sin and estrangement.
Continues Van Buren,
The unbeliever nay speak of human fear, anxiety, and bondage,
but since these conditions are measured against some other
norm than Jesus of Nazareth, and since he does not speak of
this problem as one who has been liberated by the contagion
of Jesus* freedon, he will speak in another way, 26
Some of the other ways of speaking about the human predicament in
psychological terns will be discussed in the following chapter, while
in Chapter IV shall be examined the meaning of Jesus as the Man per-
ceived by Christians as the measure of all men.
25Paul Van Buren, The :>ecular Meaning of the Gospel (New York: The
Macnillan Company, 1963), p. 179.
26Ibid.
, pp. 179-80.
CHAPTER III
THE HUMAN nUBOCMCarX IN T^YQIQLOCICAL TERMS
To speak of sin and the human predicament is to deal with the
human condition in metaphysical or theological terms, the terms that
one must use to state his transcendental concepts. But if such con-
cepts grow out of the raw data of life, they need always to be
related back to the concrete experience of human beings. This is one
of the tasks of psychology, as a branch of science concerned with the
3tudy of the human condition. Some of the ways in which the concept
of the human predicament nay be spelled out in psychological tenuis are
discussed in this chapter.
I. SIN IN THE CONTEXT OF PSYCHOLOGY
A word such as sin is at a higher level of abstraction than the
terminology of psychology and the social sciences. Strictly speaking,
it is probably not possible to define sin in psychological terms.
But the psychologist who takes sin seriously can bring the insights
of his basic assumptions to bear upon the psychological theories and
the empirical data at hand. lie nay also attempt to formulate con-
structs and hypotheses that may give expression to the underlying
notion of sin, and allow them to be tested in the psychological
laboratory and in the counselor's consulting room.
The significance of the concept of sin (or estrangement) for the
psychologist, and for the social scientist in general, lies in its
32
bi-polar approach to the question of the nature of nan. Sin points
toward both universal destiny and individual freedom. Sin refers
to the bondage of nan to forces beyond his control, but at the sane
tine acknowledges his actual, though conditional, responsibility for
himself. Theories which over-emphasize either nan's helplessness or
his freedom do not do Justice to the notion of sin.
Psychological Determinisn and Hunan Destiny
Psycholoanalytical Psychology . Various psychologists in recent
years have invited or even forced the church to re-examine its concept
of sin. The work of Signund Freud, for instance, rather contradicted
the philosophy of inevitable progress, the exaltation of reason, and
the psychologies of consciousness that prevailed in the latter 19th
century. Freud fs theories of the unconscious and of basic psycho-
biological drives have served as a needed corrective to the emphasis
on nan's freedom, and as a reminder of the determining elements that
exist within the human species. Whatever the ultimate judgment of
history nay be upon Freud's efforts as a whole, he has clearly suggested
that man's destiny may be partially shaped within his own psyche.
Behaviorism . Psychologies falling under the heading of behaviorism
also present views that imply a deterministic outlook on life. Man's
susceptibility to factors that condition his behavior and his world
view appears to have been amply demonstrated by the behaviorists.
Gordon Allport has pointed out that behaviorism in general falls
within the philosophical tradition of John Locke, wherein Locke and his
successors see the human mind as passively responding to external
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stimuli. 1 Behaviorism, despite its various modifications, stresses
what happens to the organism from the outside, and in this sense is
deterministic
.
The same may be said for environmentalisn, which stresses the
influence of the family, the culture, or social, economic, political
and historical factors, as those elements Which tend to determine the
shape of an individual's life. Allport opines that Lockean empiricism
is attractive to those who undertake the scientific study of man, for
it is so much easier to be "objective*' about events that are visible
and external than it is about What is hidden in the human mind.
The Christian need not be anti-Freudian or anti-behavior1st , however,
even if he rejects the deterministic tendencies that may underlie these
two psychological viewpoints. The psychologist who takes estrangement
seriously may accept the findings of Freud and the behavioris ts as
helpful in understanding the human predicament. Freud 9s theories of
instinctual drives, defense mechanisms, the workings of the unconscious,
and so on, may well express truths about the human animal, and so may
the learning theories of behavioris ts and environmentalists. These
viewpoints may be regarded as tentative statements of partial truths
concerning the human condition.
Yet no matter how "scientific" dynamic or behavioristic psychology
may become, the Christian cannot regard such knowledge as the whole and
final truth about the human predicament. For those factors which tend
to determine man*s existence—the so-called elements of destiny—-must
^Gordon Allport, Becoming (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1955), pp. 7ff.
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be considered along side other factors that may account for man*s
individuality, his freedom and responsibility—Ms sense of sin.
"Third Force" Psychologies and the Conditions of Freedom
'The two comprehensive theories of human nature most influencing
psychology until recently have been the Freudian and the experinental-
positi\ristic-behavioristic."2 So states Abraham Maslow, who feels that
there is now emerging "a third, increasingly comprehensive theory of
human nature" embodied in what he calls a "Third Force" in psychology. 3
The Third Force is not an organized psychological school as such, and
it is represented by a variety of viewpoints. Nor is the Third Force
necessarily opposed to its Freudian and behavioris tic heritage. 'XXir
job," Maslow say3 of psychologists, "is to integrate these various
truths into the whole truth, which should be our only loyalty."4 Maslow
sees the Third Force group as going beyond the psychologies of the past
in an effort to discover the larger truths about man.
If the concept of the human predicament as here defined is accepted
by psychologists, it would seem that psychology must be concerned not
only with the ways in which man tends to be determined, but also with
2Abrahara Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (Princeton, N. J.
:
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc."! 1962), p. vi.
Ibid . Maslow suggests that the Third Force group includes
Adlcrians, Rankians, Jungians, neo-Freudians, and post-Freudians,
(including ego-psychologists and others). He also lists personality
psychologists such as Gordon Allport, Murray, Moreno, and Murphy;
existential psychologists, Self-psychologists, Rogerians, and so on.
Maslow* s long bibliography purports to cover "a sampling of
writings by the •Third Force • group," pp. 206-214
^Ibid.
, p. iv.
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the ways in which he realizes his freedom. And if psychoanalytic and
behavioristic psychologies nay be regarded as emphasizing man in the
face of destiny, so may the Third Force be regarded as focussing upon
man as he actualizes himself under the conditions of freedom. To be
sure, it is matters of emphasis and not absolute differences that are
being discussed here. But the provocative insights of various Third
Force psychologists warrant some consideration of their views in con-
nection with this examination of the human predicament in psychological
terms.
£ Psychology of Sin—O. Hobaxt Mowrer . 0. Hobart Howrer is one
psychologist who discusses sin as such, in the context of psychology
and mental health. He rejects the heavy emphasis of Freud and the
behaviorists on the biological determinants of behavior, and suggests
that the human mind or psyche is not merely an organ to serve the
body, but that it has a life of its own—"its own special conditions
for survival . nS Mowrer concludes that "religious precepts and prac-
tices • • • have grown up largely in response to man's unique needs."
And he states that "sin" is a better word that "sickness" as a term
to describe man*s psychic problems. For unlike sickness, sin implies
moral responsibility, and carries "a vision of new potentialities,"
and "the possibility of radical redemption ( frecovery f)."6
According to Mowrer, so-called mental illness results, not from
c
0. Hobart Mowrer, The Crisis in Religion and Psychiatry (Princeton,
N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961), p. 16. Italics in the
original.
hb±d. t p. iv.
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repressed feelings, but from behavior that violates one's conscience.
The conscience is shaped by relationships with significant others,
which includes parents, friends, and the wider social community.
Bactional difficulties and genuine guilt result from actual misdeeds.
The real problem is sin, which stems frora the repression of the
conscience rather than the repression of instinctual drives. 7
In his free-swinging attack on traditional psychoanalysis and
the "myth of nental illness/' Mowrer emphasizes the reality of guilt
and sin, and the importance of accepting responsibility for one's
own psychic difficulties. He suggests that the disturbed person may
be "cured" by confession and expiation—by admitting his secret sins
and trying to atone for them. And he calls upon churches and their
clergy to stop toying with Freud and to re-emphasize confession and
penance as the means of helping people to a fuller, more satisfying
kind of life. 8
Mowrer *s arguments are, to say the least, provocative. In under-
scoring the tendency of both therapists and clients to psychologize
human problems, Mowrer rightly suggests that the notions of man #s
responsibility and culpability have been neglected, to the detriment
of man himself. In using the concept of sin, Mowrer suggests the
legitimate place of values in psychotherapy, for clients are seen
to be wrestling with moral problems, and not merely with psychological
7See also Donald F. Krill, "Psychoanalysts, Mowrer, and the
Existentialists," Pastoral Psychology (October 1965), pp. 27-36
Mowrer, op. cit. , especially Chapters 6 through 8. See as
well Mowrer, The New Group Therapy (Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand
Company, Inc .T"M5I) , Chapters 1, 4, 6, and 7.
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"kinks." Ihus Mowrer calls for a new rapprochement between psychology
and religion, which may find as a common meeting ground their related
views of the problems of guilt-ridden men.
Yet Mowrer *s emphasis on sin as a moral problem appears to over-
look the larger dimensions of the human predicament. His solution to
the problem of sin is "a clearer knowledge of principles , which we
can learn to obey and thereby live abundantly . . ."9 By making sin
synonymous with wrong-doing, Mowrer supports a theology of good works,
not unlike the Pharisees. He fails to see sin in the sense of
estrangement, and underestimates the elements of destiny in man9s
condition—the cultural and historical factors which condition one*s
sense of right and wrong, and the psycho-biological dimensions of
raan fs nature. In his zeal to criticize Freud, Mowrer, in effect,
downgrades the power of the unconscious over man^s behavior, and makes
sin primarily a matter of conscious choice.
For Mowrer, "Sin" becomes "sins"—specific acts that are morally
wrong, rather than the state of estrangement. One may, in fact,
regard Mowrer*s limited view of sin as a familiar attempt to make the
human predicament a problem of manageable proportions by indicating
an easy "way out." Mowrer may be commended for stressing man ,s respon-
sibility for his actions, the need for confession and expiation, and
all that this implies in human relationships. But he overlooks the
problems of man*s existential anxiety, his awareness of the contin-
gencies of life, the elements of destiny that man is heir to, and
Mowrer, Ihe Crisi3 in Religion and Psychiatry
, pp. 182-3.
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the efforts nen make to deal with estrangement on their own terns.
Sin, in short, is too saall a problem for Hobart Mowrer.
Self-Conccalnent—Sidney Jourard . In a book called The Trans-
parent Self
,
psychologist Sidney Jourard is concerned with particular
aspects of the human predicament. He speaks of "resistance to being,
to being oneself" in the face of another person, and he discusses at
some length the tendency of men not to disclose themselves fully to
each other. *0 Though Jourard does not mention sin as such, his concern
for human self-disclosure is not unrelated to the confession of sins
that is called for by Mowrer, who cites Jourard on this very point. 11
"Self-concealment," writes Jourard, "is regarded as the most
natural state for grown men. 12 As he elaborates on this "natural"
phenomenon and points out its effects on human well-being, he reminds
this writer of the immediate outcome of Adam and Eve's disobedience
in the Garden of Eden. 1 ** Their eyes were opened and they "knew that
they were naked," and covered themselves with aprons of fig leaves.
Then Adam and Eve hid themselves from the presence of God. The Lord
asked how they knew they were naked, and inquired whether they had
eaten the forbidden fruit. In response, Adam blamed Eve for his
actions, and Eve in turn said, "The serpent beguiled me."
^Sidney Jourard, The Transparent Self (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van
Nostrand Company, Inc. , 1964), p. 10
^iowrer, The New Group Therapy , pp. 237-8.
Jourard, op . cit
., p. iii
^Genesis 3.
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Here in this ancient nyth are caressed truths that seen most
relevant to human psychology. Man is tempted to actualize his free-
dom—by deciding for himself what he should and should not do. But
he does not face up to what he has done, and hides fron his fellow
man, from God, and from himself. He cannot admit that what he has
done has resulted from his own decision, and refuses to accept respon-
sibility for his deed.
It is undoubtedly this "natural" state of man that Jourard calls
self-concealment, in which may be seen the evidence of sin, or estrange-
ment. Man does not trust God, he is not open to his follow man, he is
not true to himself. This is self-concealnent, and it is one of the
narks of estrangement.
Jourard, of course, is hardly the only psychologist concerned
with the human tendency to hide from others and from oneself. Coun-
selors and therapists of whatever school, in one way or another,
indicate the importance of the client f s talking freely about his
problems, and thus facing himself and others. But Jourard's concentra-
tion on both the physiological and psychological effects of self-
concealment provides a clear and salient picture of this aspect of
the human predicament. His notions on the relation of "transparency"
to health will be further discussed in the next chapter.
Person or Personage—Jourard and Paul Iburnier . One of the elements
of destiny that seems bound to affect human beings to some degree is the
role that one is called on to pay in life. The role is usually socially
determined, but it may also be self-determined. Jourard points out that
roles are required because "no social system can use all of every nan fs
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self, and yet keep the social system functioning well. 14 Role-definitions
help people "learn just which actions they nust perform, and which they
nust suppress" so that the social system may function properly. 15 Jourard
exaidnes sexual, occupational, and familial roles, a3 common examples.
In a similar vein, psychiatrist Paul Tournier looks at what he
calls the "personage," a tern referring to the role of a character in
a stage play. Tournier states that "we are the slaves of the personage
which \*e have invented for ourselves or which has been imposed on us
by others."1** A man's whole life may be seen in terns of the games or
roles he plays in order to do what is expected of him, and to achieve
acceptance, recognition, approval, and a sense of security.
Both Jourard and Tournier point out that roles are unavoidable.
But they suggest that the role or personage, like the mask of the
actor, is something that the person can hide behind. Bven though
necessary, the role tends to depersonalize the player, to limit his
freedom, to turn a human being into a machine that is programmed by
his role. It is no coincidence that in this age of the machine and of
highly specialized roles, many psychologists and others arc showing an
increased concern over the problems of depersonalization in an ever more
complex society.
The very necessity of roles in human society makes it one of nan fs
determining factors, and one nark of his estrangement fron himself and
others. The psychologist's understanding of the effects of role playing
14Jourard, og. cit . , p. 54. ^bid . , p. 55.
16j?aul Tournier, The Meaning of Persons (Net* York: Harper and Row,
1957), p. 32.
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on the human psyche gives the theologian further illustration of the
human predicament. For nan in his limited freedon raist choose his
role, even though he will be determined by it in various ways. And
the human predicament nay be seen in the question, how can man be a
person and a personage at the sane tine?
Motivation and Needs—Abrahan Haslow . Another aspect of the human
condition that is relevant to the worl: of psychologists is seen in the
problem of hunan motivation and needs. Man*s needs and desires, whether
subjectively felt or objectively studied, form an area of major concern
in his life. And to the extent that human needs and motivations can be
defined and understood, they may be viewed both a3 determining forces
and as conditions for the actualization of human freedom.
Abraham Maslow's theory of human motivation is singled out here
because it is relatively recent in its formulation, and because it seems
promising of further expansion and refinement. Moreover, Maslow,s
•'holistic^Jynamic" approach to personality theory leads him to raise
the question of motivation in terms of how it functions for the hunan
being as a whole. "Hie study of motivation,*11 says Maslow, "must be in
part the study of the ultimate human goals or desires or needs. "*7
Motivation has both conscious and unconscious aspects, and is related
to perceptual and cognitive processes, to human values, to social and
cultural influences, and to hunan health and abnormality, according
to Maslow.
17Abrahan Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1954), p. 66.
42
Maslow posits what he calls a •'hierarchy of basic needs.
"
1? Most
basic are the physiological needs—hunger , rest, sex, and so on. Then,
proceeding to the "higher" needs, cone, in order, the needs for safety,
for belongin^ness and love, for esteen, and for self-actualization.
Finally, there are the desires to taiow and understand, and the aesthetic
needs
.
In general, Maslow suggests, a person does not act on a higher need
unless those lower in the hierarchy are nore or less satisfied. Only
When one's Ivunger is assuaged is he "free" to concern hiriself nore
fully with his desires for security and safety; the person preoccupied
with a need for love nay devote little attention to a need for esteen
or self-actualization. But as Maslow repeatedly points out, the order
of these hypothesised needs is not fixed, and there are other deternin-
ants of behavior besides needs and desires. And often one's activities
are designed to satisfy several needs at once, such as one's occupation,
Which nay be related to any and all of the basic needs.
Maslow further postulates that the frustration of the basic needs
nay be a prinary cause of socio-pathic behavior or nental illness.
But he is nore interested in the role of need gratification and the
development of "healthy" personality. His notions of health and
self-actualization will be exanined further in the fourth section of
this paper.
In the context of this discussion of the hunan predicanent, it
is interesting to note that Maslow suggests that his postulated basic
lsIbid. , Chapter 5.
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needs are instinctold in nature. "Our nain hypothesis," he writes,
"is that hunan urges or basic needs alone nay be innately given to
at least 3one appreciable degree."*^ His cautious language here stems
fron his wish to avoid the wide dichotomy that in the past has often
separated instinct.Ivis ts and environmentalists. He opines that nan
is partially determined by hereditary needs (though they are intrin-
sically directionless, unlike animal instincts), and partially deter-
nincd by the environnent, as well. Maslow thus chooses a niddle ground
in the long-standing debate over heredity "versus" environnent.
Maslow*s theories are of interest here because he allows roon
for the hunan predicament in his hypotheses. He recognizes the influ-
ence of various hunan needs and of nan's environnent, but suggests
that none of these is all-deternining of hunan behavior. Indeed,
writes, Maslow, nan's need for self-actualization and grov/th is also
ins tinetoid—part of nan's "essential inner nature."2^
In Maslow's terns, then, the Iiunan predicanent nay be seen in
the fact that nan faces conflicting inner needs and external forces
with which he nust sonehow cone to terns. Both hereditary factors
and the environnent are beyond nan's complete control, and appear as
elenents of destiny. Therefore, the hunan "need for self-actualization"
nust be fulfilled in the face of the environmental and biological
determinants that condition the exercise of hunan freedom.
It goes without saying perhaps, that scientists in other fields
19Ibid.
, p. 127.
*Tiaslow, Toward a Psychology of Being
, p. 178. In this later
volume, '.'.aslow concentrates on the question of self-actualization
and the meaning of psychological health.
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of study nay provide valuable information and understanding concerning
the natural and social environments in which man lives. The human
predicament, in other words, is more than a natter of psychological
concern. But since it centers in the human being, the logical point
at which to focus the study of the human condition seems to be that
branch of science known as psychology.
II. PSYCHOLOGY IN SEARCH OF AN OTTOLOGY
In this brief discussion of the human predicament in psycholo-
gical terms, it is apparent that one may look at the work of a variety
of psychologists, and find fragments of the truth about the human
condition in a number psychological theories and schools. ..hat one
calls the truth depends, of course, on one's fundamental assumptions
or faith or Weitanschauung . And as this paper may illustrate, it is
no simple matter to apply directly the perspective of one fs transcen-
dental concepts, such as a Christian view of man, to the vast arena
of human life and experience. Or perhaps it is more helpful to say
that psychology, as one of the life sciences, has yet to produce a
unified body of knowledge, because psychologists do not agree on what
their basic assumptions might be. There appears to be no immediate
prospect of changing this situation, and psychologists may be expected
to continue to study man from the standpoint of their various world views,
There are, however, a number of psychologists who are concerned
about enlarging the traditional perspectives of psychology, and who
wish to understand man in all his biological, social, and historical
complexity. Maslow, for instance, looks for a "psychology of being,"
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and suggests that psychology must begin with an underlying ontology. 2*
Gordon Allport has long called for a psychology that is both idiographic
and nomothetic in its approach to the study of nan. A "broadened
psychology," writes Allport, will take into account both human indi-
viduality and general laws of human behavior, and see both as necessary
for an understanding of man. 22 other 'Third Force" psychologists have
similarly indicated their dissatisfaction with psychologies that present
a view of nan that is too n**row, too "scientific," too restricted by
the underlying assumptions that form the starting points.
An Existentialist Approach to Psychology
Maslow believes that "the existentialists may supply psychology
with the underlying philosophy which it now lacks."23 If the basic
philosophical questions are re-opened for discussion, states Maslow,
"perhaps psychologists will stop relying on pseudo-solutions or on the
unconscious, unexamined philosophies they picked up as children."
Maslow thus echoes Rollo May*s call for psychologists continually to
analyze and clarify their own presuppositions.
It is Hollo May, more than anyone else in this country, who has
championed the existentialist approach to psychology. The two pertinent
volumes which May has edited, and to which he is a major contributor, are
21Ibid., p. 15.
Gordon Allport, Personality , A Psychological Interpretation ,
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937, pp. 22-3.
23Maslow, og. cit
. , p. 10.
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Existence
, A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology
,
2^ and Existen-
tial Psychology
,
25
v/Iiich were published in 195S and 1960, respectively.
May*s existentialist viewpoint is implicit in his other works, including
his latest book, Psychology and the Hunan Dilemma .**
As Tillich has stated, "existential** is the opposite of "detached.
"
27
It is the false sense of detachment or of scientific objectivity that
Rollo May calls into question when he pleads for psychologists to be
aware of their basic assumptions. For, as many psychologists are begin-
ning to realize, their transcendental concepts of man cannot but affect
their hypotheses, and the interpretation of data resulting from their
attempts to test those hypotheses. May cites some recent research by
Robert Rosenthal at Harvard which demonstrated how "experimenter bias"
affects even the performance of rats in a maze. 23 The point is that
no scientist can completely divorce himself from what he is looking at.
There is a "subject-object polarity," but not a separate subject and
object, even in the scientific laboratory. 29 And as a therapist, May
has come to feel that "every psychotherapist is existential to the
extent that he is a good therapist, i.e., that he is able to grasp the
^Rollo May, Ernest Angel, & Henri Ellenberger (eds.), Existence ,
A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology (New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1958). Hereinafter referred to as Existence .
25Rollo May (ed.), Existential Psychology (New York: Randon
House, 1961).
2oRollo May, Psychology and -foe Human Dilemma (Princeton, N. J.:
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 196V)
.""
^See above, p. 20.
^lay, og. cit., p. 21. ^Ibid . , p. 10
47
patient In his reality" and to become involved in that reality. 30
The Quest for a Scientific Psychology
May is well aware that the existential approach, either in the
laboratory or in the consulting room, sounds unscientific, for science,
by its very nature, is objective and non-existential. But May insists
that "the existential movement in psychiatry and psychology arose pre-
cisely out of a passion to be not less but more empirical."31 He calls
upon psychologists to remove the blinders of their traditional precon-
ceptions, Which seem to limit their view of man. And he states what
may be called the existentialist^ credo, as follows:
there is no such thing as truth or reality for a living human
being except as he participates in it, is conscious of it,
has some relationship to it. 32
Furthermore, nomothetic science is concerned to discover general
laws and to define "essences." In philosophical terms, science is
"essentialist" as opposed to "existentialist." May admits that essences
cannot be ruled out of science, but adds that "you cannot adequately
describe or understand a living human being ... on an •essentialist*
basis. "33
May goes on to say that neither laws of human nature nor thera-
peutic techniques per se, no matter how sophisticated, will heal the
anxious and suffering person in the therapist fs office. It is the
therapist's commitment to his client as he actually exists, and the
30
May, Existential Psychology
,
p. 19.
31May, Existence
, p. 8. Italics in original.
32May, Bxistential Psychology
,
p. 17. 33Ibid .
interaction between these two persons, that allows the possibility
of healing to occur. It is the therapist's involvement with the
patient, and what they experience together, that enables the thera-
pist to see the world as his client sees it, and thus coiae to know
bin as an individual. Scientific principles provide only limited
knowledge of each separate person.
Existential psychology offers, not a new nethod, but a different
attitude toward nan, and toward the study of nan. The existentialist
believes that nan is nore than a tabula rasa, for nan is the creature
who attributes xaeaninp to vAiat he perceives and experiences. Bach nan,
in a sense, makes his own world, as he decides what is significant and
meaningful for him. Though nan recognizes his finiteness and is aware
of his destiny, he exercises his freedom in that he decides in what
ways he shall cone to terns with the determining elements in his life.
.And as a man shapes his world and chooses his world view, so does
he fashion his own self. In The Cocktail Party , Sir Henry perceives
the truth of man's self-definition, and he answers Celia's question
concerning whether she is "normal" or not by saying, "We must find out
about you, before we decide/Vhat is normality."35 Bach person has his
own hopes, his own potentialities and limitations, his own thrust
toward self-actualization. Any nomothetic definition of nan is some-
what culturally determined, and can be applied to individuals only
^Cf . George r.elly'3 two volume work, The Psychology of Personal
Constructs GJew York: V.'. W. Norton & Co. , Inc., 1955) , in which Kelly
builds a~theory of personality based on the proposition that a person's
constructs actually shape his world and his own self.
35Bliot, og. jCit., p. 359
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with endless qualification. The person who seeks to be merely like
other people may hinself be unhappy, stunted, and lacking in a sense
of his own self. 36
Ute existential psychologist strives to understand nan in terras
of his being , and to grasp hin in ontological terras. As Maslow has
put it, existentialism
deals radically with that hunan predicament presented by the
gap between hunan aspirations and human linitations (between
what a hunan being jls , what he would like to be , and what he
could be). . . A person is both actuality and potentiality. 3''
An .Existentialist View of Being
In Chapter II of Existence , Rollo May discusses the existentialist
view of the hunan predicament at some length. First he tackles the
question of being and its concomitant, non-being, and the ontological
anxiety that a person knows as he faces the contingency of his exist-
ence. He points out that in the phrase, hunan being, being is a parti-
ciple, and this implies being something . 38 Since men exist in time,
being also entails becoming—the realizing of potentials which takes
place now in the future. Ontological guilt arises as the result of
has
a person fs awareness that he/not fulfilled his potentialities—that
he has not been true to his essential self. Celia Coplestone refers
to this when she nentions "a craving for something I cannot find/And
the shame of never finding it."39 The hunan predicament nay thus be
3
^S.g., see Jourard, og. cit
., p. 99.
oslow, op. cit., p. 10.
3
^iay, Existence
, p. 41.
39Eliot, 0£. cit . , p. 363.
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described as nan ?aiowing he is responsible for his own being or beconing
in the face of his destiny, which, in ontological terns, entails the
threat of non-bcii
May enlarges on the question of being as he describes "three
nodes of world" that characterize human existence.^ First is Unwelt
,
"the biological world, generally called the environnent." Second,
there is the Kitwelt
,
the world of nan*s relationships with his fellow
nen. Finally, there is Higcnwclt , the "node of relationship to one*s
self."
Unwelt, the naterial world, is sinply given, and is the world of
"finiteness and biological determinism." May refers to Ludwig Bin»-
wanger , s coiunents to the effect that Freudfs great contribution to
psychology was in the area of "nan in relation to nature (Unwelt)
—
drives, instincts, and similar aspects of experience."41 But Bin-
swanger felt that Freud showed little "understanding of man in relation
to his fellow nen (Mitwelt ) and that the area of man in relation to
himself (Bigcnwelt) was onmitted entirely" in Freud's \</orJ:. 42
A great deal of what is usually called psychology is concerned
with the Unwelt—what it is, and how man "adapts" or ^adjusts" to it.
May insists, however, that the existential analysts take Unwelt
seriously, "with greater reality than those who segment it into •drives*
and •substances,* because they are not limited to Unwelt alone, but see
iviay, o£. cit
. , pp. 61ff.
41May, Existential Psychology
,
p. 32.
42Ibid . "Eie quote is from May fs paraphrasing of a paper written
by Binswanger.
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it also in the context of hunan self-awareness. "43 UrareIt is not the
only node of existence, and hence it is "an over-siriplification and
radical error" to try to force all of hunan experience to fit the
categories of Unwelt . "In thi3 connection," May concludes, "the
existential analysts are nore enpirical , that is, more respectful of
actual hunan phenoEiena, than the ncchanists or postivists. 44
-
twelt has to do, not sinply with social deterninants, but with
the world of inter-relationships of persons. If another person is
regarded nerely as "needed" or "useful" or the object of libidinal
drives, he is being treated as m object—as part of the Unbelt . Mitwelt
,
on the other hand, is the world of the relationships of people to each
other as persons , this involves nutual awareness, personal decision,
conttitnent to the other person, and the "structure of meaning which is
designed by the inter-relationship of the persons in it."45 May suggests
that Martin Buber f s "I and Thou" philosophy has "developed implications
of Mitwelt . ,t4 6 The essence of relationship is that both persons are
"nutually affected by the encounter," May states.
Bigenwelt , or "own world," presupposes "self-awareness, self-
relatedness, and is uniquely present in human beings."4
'
3' It is "not
eserely a subjective, inner experience; it is rather the basis on which
we sec the real world in its true perspective, the basis on which we
relate." To use May*s illustration, if a person says a flower is
43May, Existence
, pp. 61-2. ^Ibid . , p. 62. 45Ibid .
*%•• Martin Buber, I and Thou (New York: Charles 5cribner ts
Sons, 1958).
47
May, Existence, p. 63.
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beautiful, he is not describing a flower in a purely objective way,
but inferring that the flower is beautiful for him . In this way, May
underlines the dichotomy in i/estern thought between subject and object,
and reiterates the existentialist notion that truth or reality exists
for a person only as he relates himself to it and participates in it.
The onission of £igenv;elt "has much to do with the fact that modern
people tend to lose the sense of reality of their own experiences."4
"
Hie question of relationship to oneself (Sigenwelt) is the node of
world least adequately dealt with by contemporary psychology.
May points out that the three nodes of world are "always inter-
related and always condition each other," for they are "three simul-
taneous modes of Ixiing-in-the-world."4^ lie adds that the reality of
one*s existence is lost if "one of these nodes is enphasized to the
•nmmi » m<w i " w»pi*iw> i *—mmm wm**mmmmmmm—mmmm>~ »— i m»
exclusion of the other two."^
Rollo May*s Concept of the Hunan Dilemma
In a recent book, May speaks specifically of what he calls the
human dilemma in a frame of reference similar to that of the nodes of
world. He posits that "the human dilenua is that which arises out of
nan's capacity to experience himself as both subject and object at the
same time. Both are necessary . . ."51
Man knows himself as an object, as part of tlie world that is
created, contingent, determined (Unwelt) . But at the same tine he is
48Ibid. 49Ibid.
5 Ibid . Italics in original
^May, Psychology and the Human Dilemma , p. 8.
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aware that he is a subject—one on whom certain forces are acting, and
one who is doing the experiencing. Manvs ability to see himself as
both object and subject, continues May, "i3 very close to what is often
termed •self-relatedness.'" Self-relatedness "implies the capacity to
52
relate to other selves (Mitwelt) as well as to one's own self" (Eigenwelt)
.
And man's dilemma may be seen in that he cannot be pure subject, but if
he pretends to be pure object, he becomes unrelated to his experiences,
and something less than a human being.
May alludes to Tillich ts notion of man's "finite freedom" as
descriptive of the human dilemma. He paraphrases Tillich and states
that
man is finite in the respects that he is subject to death,
illness, limitations of intelligence, perception, experience,
and other deterministic forces ad infinitum. But at the
same time man has freedom jto relate to these forces ; he can
be aware of them, give them meaning, and select and throw
his weight in favor of this or that force operating upon
him. 53
III. THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT AND A PSYCHOLOGY OP BEING
Rollo May's reference to Tillich suggests that this discussion of
the human predicament in psychological terms has returned to its starting
point. By citing the work of various psychologists, there have been
found several ways of describing the human dilemma so that both destiny
and freedom are acknowledged. Some psychologists, such as Mowrer and
Tournier, take "sin" for granted, and try to incorporate this concept
into their respective theories. Jourard and others illustrate the
significance of self-concealment , and show how it may be regarded as
52
Ibid.
, p. 195.
53
Ibid., p. 11.
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a nark of estrangement. Jourard and Tournier consider the deternining
effects of a person's role in life, and ask how a nan can be a person
in his own right and a personage at the sane tine. Maslow theorizes
that nan is partially detemined by his inherent nature and partially
by his environment, but suggests that one of man's basic needs is to
actualize himself according to his own self-chosen determinants. And
Polio May, expressing his existentialist viewpoint, acknowledges the
human predicament in terns of nan's knowing himself as both subject
and object at the same time.
Bach of these several points of view takes into account, in
varying ways, the factors that limit or determine man's existence, and
at the same time allows a measure of human freedom and self-determi-
nation. Yet is is apparent that it is not easy to describe the human
predicament in psychological terras. Ihe data and the vision of
psychologists are hardly unequivocal, and are richly varied in their
description of the human species. Psychologists are a long way from
speaking with one voice regarding man. And this is hardly surprising,
for psychology is a young science, and one in which the spirit of
controversy may be expected to prevail for years to come. Perhaps the
worst thing that could happen to psychology is that its practitioners
might pretend too soon to have the truth they are still looking for.
Almost all of the Third Force psychologists referred to in this
paper cite the work of Paul Tillich in one context or another. This
does not necessarily indicate complete agreement with Tillich, but
does suggest that psychologists* transcendental concepts nay be stated
or argued in theological terms. Though this in itself is nothing new,
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there does appear to be an increased awareness by nany psychologists
of the fundamental importance of the basic assumptions that must
underlie the study of nan. In nany respects, psychology seens to be
searching for an ontology that will provide coherence for its view of
nan. There are others besides Abraham Maslow who are working "toward
a psychology of being."
The words of Gordon Allport may aptly provide the conclusion for
this chapter entitled, "The Hunan Predicament in Psychological Terms."
Allport writes:
The goal of psychology is to reduce discord among our philo-
sophies of man, and to establish a scale of probable truth,
so that we may feel increasingly certain that one interpreta-
tion is truer than another. The goal is as yet unattained;
as our discussion suggests, it probably lies far in the
future. 54
Allport goes on to say that the "major task of psychology today
is to enlarge its horizons without sacrificing its gains." And he
calls for a psychology that is relevant to man's major problems, and
concerned, not only with what a man is, but also what he nay become.
It is this latter concern that is the focal point of the next chapter.
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""Allport, Becoming
, p. 17.
CHAPTER IV
HEALING, HEALTH, AND THE NATURE OP MAN
What can a nan become? What is a "normal" person? What does it
mean to say a human being is "healthy?" A discussion of the human
predicament seems to beg such questions, for which the answere nust
be stated primarily in terms of one 9 s transcendental concepts. Yet
these questions are of vital concern to the psychologist as he
approaches the study of man. And for the therapist or counselor,
an understanding of human health and potentialities is necessary,
so that the goals and the means of the healing process nay be clearly
spelled out and actualized. Hence this chapter will deal with the
underlying assumptions that make an understanding of healing and health
possible, first in theological terns, and then in terns of the science
of psychology. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the
ways in which theological and psychological concepts of man nay meet
and overlap.
I . THE NATURE OF THB TERMS : HEALTH VS . NORMALITY
The concept of health is one of the fundamental presuppositions
that psychologists and counselors will necessarily hold and be aware
of, at least implicitly. As Sidney Jourard has pointed out, health
is not a "given." It is "a value concept," and as such is something
that "we must define . . ."*
Jourard, The Transparent Self , p. 100.
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V/hat Jourard has in nind is not dimply health in a r cdical sense,
but ahat is nore likely to be referred to as mental health, or even
spiritual well-being. Likewise, the concern here is with health in
its nore etymological sense of wholeness , as applied to the person
in his totality. It is in this regard that health is a value concept.
It is well to differentiate, as Jourard does, between health and
normality . Thcreas the former nust be defined in the context of basic
assumptions, normality is, by definition, a relative tern that refers
to "those patterns of behavior which are common or typical in a
specified group—the kinds of things sociologists tabulate."2 Normality
has to do with what people actually do, and this may or nay not be in
accord with what is defined as healthy.
Normality will be described differently in various cultures and
eras. Health, on the other hand, is a concept less likely to change,
for it has to do with what a person can be or might be, rather than with
how the "average" person acts in a given time or place. To be sure,
health and normality are not entirely unrelated, for health (or whole-
ness) is defined by abstracting certain valued behaviors from among the
vast repertoire of human actions. But unlike normality, the definition
of health depends upon an underlying concept of man, on the basis of
which the valued behaviors are selected.
Sometimes, of course, normality and health are considered synony-
mous. This occurs when what is statistically average is deemed the
criterion of health, in which case health is subject to a cultural
2Ibid., p. 00.
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relativism. Or normality nay simply nean what is suggested above about
health, so that the valued behaviors are called normal, and normality
becones a normative rather than a relative term. Either use of the
word, normality, nay be acceptable, as long as it is clearly defined.
3ut in this instance, as already stated, nomality will be regarded in
a statistical sense, and health defined as a value concept derived
from sone basic assumptions about the nature of nan.
II. TOWARD A CHRISTIAN VIEW OF HEALTH
The transcendental concepts about the nature of nan discussed in
this report point toward a definition of health in the sane theological
terras. In Tillich , s words,
healing means reuniting that which is estranged, giving a
center to what is split, overcoming the split between God
and nan, nan and his world, nan and himself.
If nan is "estranged from his true being," he is, by definition,
not whole or healthy, but finds whdeness as he is reunited with his
true self, his fellow man, and with the ground of his being. Health
means being what one "essentially is and ought to be," and thus over-
coming the human predicament, which is man's estrangement.
^
-ich a definition of health leaves unanswered the question of
what man essentially is and ought to be. It is at thi3 juncture that
one*s basic assumptions come into play. If it is true, as Jourard
has said, that "health is not given in nature," and is something "we
STillich, Systenatic Theology , II, 166.
4Ibid., p. 45; quoted above, page 22.
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must define," there is no way to avoid value ,'udgricnts and
positing transcendental concepts when defininr health. To be sure,
one*s fundamental beliefs are based variously on onc fs own experi-
ence, on the experiences,, thought and wor!: of other?, on scientific
research, and so on. But the final decision in making a definition
of health requires value judgments , and results in a statement of onc*s
beliefs regarding the nature of nan.
Jesus , the Essential Man
Christians inevitably point to Jesus the Christ as the basis of their
understanding of what man "essentially is and ought to be." As a nan,
Jesus was subject to all the conditions of estrangement, including
death, but was not Himself estranged. The center of His being remained
in unity with God—a unity He maintained against all the attacks of
estranged existence.
Jesus reveals the divine love for creation by surrendering Him-
self to its existential self-destructiveness. It is in this way that
He reconciles and reunites, or, as Tillich puts it, He conquers "the
gap between essence and existence."2
In the person of Jesus of Nazareth, then, the Christian sees man
as he essentially is. Jesus is the actualization of the image of God
in which man is created. It is Jesus, the fully human person, the
whole man, Who is the measure of human wholeness or health. And
through the divine power that was manifest in Jesus as the Christ,
Sjbid., p. 119.
60
salvation, that is, the healing that leads to wholeness, is offered
to all men. Jesus is thus both The Man, and the Christ, through V*on
other nen nay realize in thenselves the image of God.
Healing and S alvation
The word, salvation, is from the Latin salvus , which means "healed."
Tillich makes clear that the Christian concept of salvation "can be
lied to every act of healing: to the healing of sickness, of
demonic possession, of servitude to sin and to the ultimate power of
death." 6 Jesus* ministry nay be seen as a healing (saving) ministry,
for these were the things He was concerned with—sickness, demonic
possession, servitude to sin, and the power of death. Those who have
been nade whole through Jesus the Christ speak of their newness of
life, of life abundant, or life eternal—all of which expressions try to
convey that life is radically different for those who live "in Christ. M
Describing the life of the "new creature," Tillich comments,
Obviously, the characteristics of the New Being are the oppo-
site of those of estrangement, namely, faith instead of
unbelief, surrender instead of hubris , love instead of
concupiscence .
?
That is, sin or estrangement is overcome in those who participate
in the New Being in Christ. Concupiscence—nan's desire to reunite
himself by his own efforts with that from which he is estranged—
nay be given up in the face of the reconciliation that has been
effected by God In Christ. Hubris—man's putting himself at the
allien, Jystecatic Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1951), I. 146.
7Ibid. , II, 177.
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center of his world—is done away with viien man acknowledges the
true ground and center of his being. And unbelief—man's turning
away from God—is conquered by faith, which raalces possible the
receiving of the New Being in Christ.
Christians have always emphasized the inj ortance of faith in
nan's relationship to Cod, but it should be made clear that faith is
not merely the intellectual assent to certain doctrines* Faith is
the "state of being grasped" by the Ultimate, lino is at work seeking
reconciliation with estranged man before man can respond with faith.
Faith implies, first, God's action, and then uan*s responsibility—
his need and ability to respond—to the New Being in Christ VJho seeks
his response. Faith is the "channel" through vfcich God works. And
faith is man's acceptance that he is accepted, even in the face of
his unacceptability. Tillich summarizes this by saying that this means
one is drawn into the power of toe New Being in Christ,
which makes faith possible; that it is the state of unity
between God and man, no matter how fragmentarily realized.
Accepting that one is accepted is tie paradox of salvation
without which there would be no salvation but only despair. s
Tillich warns against the unbiblical belief that salvation is
either total or non-existent, which he calls an "absurd and demonic
idea."9 He argues that there is no absolute alternative between sali-
vation and condemnation, and states that
Only as salvation is understood as healing and saving power
through the New Being in all history is the problem put on
another level. In some degree, all men participate in the
healing power of the New Being. Otherwise, they would have
no being. The self-destructive consequences of estrangement
Slbid., p. 179. ^Ibid., p. 167.
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would have destroyed then.. But no men are totally healed,
not even those who have encountered the healing power as it
cars in Jesus as the Christ. ^
Christ nay be seen, then, as the "ultimate criterion of every
healing and saving process ," though that povier nay be found even
v&ere Christ #s name is not lenown. Those who bwri encountered Him are
only "fragmentarily healed." "The Christian renains in a state of
relativity with respect to salvation," says Tillich, but in Christ
Himself the healing quality is "complete and unlimited," which is
why He is called the Christ, liherever there is healing power in
mankind, "it must be judged by the saving power in Jesus as the
Christ."11
Christ , the Savior and Healer
To call the Christ the criterion and the source of health and
salvation is to proclaim Kin as Lord. Being the criterion, Christ is
the Judge of all men, whose sin and estrangement are seen in the light
of His wholeness and His unity with the Father, with others, and Hira-
self. And as the source of health. He enables men to come to terms
with their estrangement and their brokenness through reconciliation
and reunion in Him.
It is faith—being grasped by the Hew Being—that allows man to
face his sin and acknowledge his responsibility for his predicament.
Only in faith can Christ* s followers confess, "And there is no health
in us."12 Though the Church usually speaks of confession and absolu-
tion, or of repentencc and forgiveness, in that order, it is actually
1 Ibid . ulbid . 12The Book of Common Prayer , p. 6.
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the other way around. It is the knowledge that one is already accepted
that makes the confession of sin possible. It is the assurance that
one if received and forgiven that enables him to repent—to turn away
fron self and toward God as the center of one*s life.
Though Christians regard Jesus Christ as the criterion and the
source of God*s healing power, and as He Who overcomes estrangement
and sin, Christians cannot pretend themselves to be the epitome of
health. It is obvious that men still live under the conditions of
estrangement, and that even the greatest of the saints are not com-
pletely healed in the midst of this life. The basis of human faith and
hope is the New Being which las appeared in Christ. But the work begun
in Christ is not yet completed, so that Christians look for His Second
Coming, when sin and estrangement will be finally overcome, and the
promises of God in Christ will be fulfilled.
The Christian rejoices, not because he has been totally healed,
but because he has been accepted by, and reconciled with, the ground of
his being, even though "there is no health in" him. The man of faith
does not, therefore, seek health for its own sake, or pretend that he
can make himself acceptable, for estranged man cannot heal or save
himself. But to the extent that man receives the healing power of God,
and participates in the New Being, he realizes the promise of God to
restore him to health—to what he essentially is. Tillich suggests
that this participation and realization may be momentary and fragmen-
tary in man. Yet those who are grasped by the New Being will be con-
stantly renewed and find that their sin and estrangement is overcome.
The signs of wholeness, in the words of Tillich, are "faith instead of
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unbelief, surrender instead of hubris , love instead of concupiscence."
It is the promise of God in Christ that health and salvation are
offered to all nen that the Church proclaims to the world.
III. HEALING AND HEALTH AS PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS
If the goal of psychology, as Gordon Allport puts it, is to "reduce
discord anong our philosophies of nan," the presentation of a view of
nan in Christian terms nay only illustrate how forraidible the task of
psychology is. VJhat, after all, can psychologists do with the concepts
that are peculiar to a particular religious faith, it might well be
asked. Yet, theology and psychology may share a common concern with
man to the extent that each discipline recognizes what has been called
the human predicament. And likewise, both psychologists and theologians
wrestle with the questions of healing and health. Surely it is in
finding and clarifying the areas of overlapping assumptions about man
that psychology begins to fulfill the assignment that Allport has
suggested for it.
The concern of psychologists for the health and well-being of man
has been given a tremendous boost by the advent of Freudian thought
and practice, the mental health movement, and the rise of clinical
psychology. The focus, however, has in general been upon illness
rather than health, and psychologists seem better able to describe
ailing man than whole man. Psychology can, to some degree, provide
an understanding of man in the face of his predicament, and illustrate
how man responds to some of the elements of destiny that impinge upon
him. But psychologists are harder put to describe and explain how man
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deals creatively out of his freedom with the conditions of life as he
experiences then. Terns such as psychological or mental health rcnain
ambiguous and misleading, as many psychologists will readily admit.
Yet psychology needs a concept of health, both to give substance
to what it calls illness, and to provide direction for those who use
psychology in the service of healing. To work out a viable definition
of health, psychologists must study so-called healthy persons at least
to the same extent that they have already examined the mentally ill.
The establishment of such a definition could conceivably aid in reducing
the discord among the philosophies of nan.
Current Theories of Psychological Health
A number of theories of health already exist on the psychological
scene. An interesting and fruitful discussion of these is presented
by Marie Jafcoda in Current Concepts of Positive Mental Health . 3,3
Her survey of the relevant literature has led her to summarize six
approaches to the notion of health that are presently held by
psychologists
.
The Criteria of Health . Stressing that she is presenting various
criteria of "positive mental health," Jahoda categorizes six proposed
indicators of health as follows:
D attitudes of an individual toward his own self , some aspects
of which include accessibility to consciousness, correctness
of the self-concept, feelings about the self, and the sense
of identity; 14
13Marie Jahoda, Current Concepts of Positive Mental Health
(New York: Basic Books, Inc
.
, 1958)
.
14Tbid.
, pp. 24-30.
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2) the individual's style and degree of growth , developnent or
self-actualization
,
which entails notivational processes,""
and one's "investment in living ;"15
3) psychological integration as a central function, related to
which Jahoda discusses the balance of psychic forces, the
importance of a unifying outlook on life, and resistance
to stress; 16
4) independence or autonomy , which concerns the individual's
relation to his enviornnent, and the degree to which beha-
vior is regulated from within; 17
^ perception of reality , two aspects of which are freedom
frori need dTstortion, and empathy or social sensitivity; 1 **
6) environnental mastery , under which heading Jahoda looks at
such things as adequacy in love, work, and play, the meeting
of situational reguirements , adaptation and adjustment, and
problem solving.
"
The first three listed criteria of mental health emphasize the
person's relation to himself, while the last three are more concerned
with the individual's relation to his environment. Jahoda points out,
however, that these six approaches to the concept of mental health are
not mutually exclusive, and, in fact, overlap in many ways, which
Jahoda finds encouraging.
It must be admitted, however, that there does not yet exist a
clear and unified psychological concept of health. A great deal of
research is needed, but its success, states Jahoda, "will to no small
degree depend on further clarification of some general ideas in the
mental health field. ,t2^ Jahoda thus underscores the need for clearly
defined fundamental assumptions about man which may lead to the develop-
ment of theories and constructs concerning health that can be empirically
1
^Ebid., pp. 30-35. 16Ibid . , pp. 35-45.
17Ibid
. , pp. 45-49.
lsIbid
. , pp. 49-53.
19Ibid
. , pp. 53-56.
2QIbid
. , p. 66.
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tested.
Specific Vs .General Definitions of Health . Jahoda proceeds to try
to clarify some of the issues that have been raised in the effort to
define mental health. She begins by noting that the tremendous diver-
sity among persons regarded as healthy suggests that nultiple criteria
of health nay be necessary. It may be impossible to find a common
denominator by which health can be measured for all people; the six
sets of criteria presented above nay actually point to the legitimate
variations that exist among different persons.
The question of health is raised in The Cocktail Party when Celift
wonders if she is "abnormal." Ihe answer she receives i3 that " v/e
must find out what would be normal/For you , before we use the word
•abnornal. #"21 T. 3. Eliot is here clearly suggesting that health
(or "normality," in this case) must finally be defined in terms of the
individual concerned.
To imply that defining health is a matter of understanding whole-
ness in terms of each individual is to present scientists with a seeming-
ingly endless task. But those who wish to preserve individual uniqueness
and the possibility of a scientific approach to the question of health
may agree with Jahoda that "every man is in some respects like no other
man, in some respects like some other men, and in some respects like
all other men."22 If that statement is acceptable to psychologists,
21Sliot, 0£. cit., p. 361.
22
Jahoda, Og. cit
. , p. 69; Jahoda is here paraphrasing a statement
in Kluckhohn and Murray, Personality in Nature , Society and Culture
CNew York: Alfred Knopf, 194S)
.
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they ray well be able to incorporate the question of health into whet
Gordon Allport calls a broadened psychology that is both idiographic
and nomothetic in its study of man. Such a psychology nay avoid
overgeneralirationa and at the sane time allow eons fee the compleni-
ties of hnraw beings.
Health vs. Illness . Another knotty question discussed by Jahoda
is the relationship of health and disease. 2s cental health the
absence of disease, or vice-versa? Can a person be sick in sane ways
end healthy in others? These ace complex questions that remain to he
answered in the field of psychology. It is possible to conceive of
health and illness as independent and contrasting conditions* and to
noting TIHich's thought that no person is either totally whole, or
absolutely without eleaents of wholeness, though he nay be described
as sick. This question is but one aspect of the larger problem
regarding cental health wherein the urgent need for further thought
and research is readily s&m.
Health roKJ Values. Tahoda reminds her readers that defining:
health is a natter of values. As such, health is inter-related with
other values, which nay at tines conflict with each other. Psycho-
somatic medicine and the work of social scientists combine to surest
that so-called mental health is not unrelated to both physiological
and sociological conditions. VJhat the physician or the society calls
cood or healthy nay net agree with what the psychologist defines as
ncntil health. And the values of society nay not be the sane in
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different tines and places.
the com iterations should serve as a reiiioder that no »Vifinition
of health can be absolutized, and that dental health per ae ray net he
the highest value in life. If achieving health becomes on m& in itself*
it em becen* a false god—an attempt at self-salvation or self-healing
on one*s en terns.
If estranged sea does, in fact, have a "sense of sin,* he is
And the big question is. how z*ay health tbe attained? Assuming that
wholeeeep can he defined, how does doe get there free* bare? Shear
<<ft«stt le*a#ne^f r%*\A * %'l^^i3 jfn 1 iaxr ^*t«/^o^»^E ffnes Ann aeWl iAfMi'lii 1iai wt4 ^tua^»^a e^tflh
•* *flp'""^* "•^^•^f•• v^^^hiv ^pnqsmv enee ^p^b •w^^kse^BwwH™ ^^^^pwi^'^p^h'a^B^^^ ^p^sse ^n^^w ^^fc^^F^ff^^P^ swwwws'e ^w*^p*pewp ^ee^^^
engage In the study of aen. And the sane Questions demand answers
^Hfc^f^w was^RJfcw(fc'»a^^ w*w iwww %^Ti^^aeww^p^^iFinw £ wt& ^pes^py seie^*ae w** j*e*^n w^*«*ne a*eaee v a*ew^^jr ^^ni^p
engaged in the process of healing with their clients.
Psychology is not without sent tentative answers to the question
of what leads t© health, m& a few of these will he Ionised at briefly
here.
Sidney Jourard and Transparency . Sidney Joarardfs veins*, The
Trananerojat Self , is, in essence, en essay on health and how to
Kill 11 we and aaiatain it. It is not a systenat: c treatise, bat an
effort to relate e good deal of existing looowledge to his own under*
standing of illness and health. Jourard is concerned, not only vith
nental health, hut alee with well-being in its broadest arpeets—with
the physical, aental, and "spiritual** aspects of huoan health.
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"Sfttrangltraeat. eJLicsavicia froa owsH real $*l£,n writes Jourard,
is "a sickness tfcich is so wisely seated that no one recognises it."*3
Jourard thus relates .leaito to aed^s oaasclr^to "realiseif-being,"
as Ik pats it. ;Ie see* playias onefs role in life to the sscljsiou of
twins oneself as a ra ter causa cec ilJb3es&. ftoiftt are ixaavaidahi*. ta
be aura. But Jourard adds that "everywhere we see people who have aold
their soul, or their real self, If you wish," to fulfill, a role for its
«ai eafct.34 Such persons tend to relate to others and to thenselves
only in tanas of their role, and hence they lose touch with their real
selves, and with other person* as persons .
If hiding our true selves under our role seises us ill (e.g.,
anxious, despairing, without purpose or a sense of identity, or even
physically ill), rtfarflffgiflg oturaalf to another parses leads to health,
•ays Jourard. Self-disclosure and "being transparent to others, seaaa
to be a necessary condition for being open to oneself."^ Bat fftfflHfig
ene*s true self to another la risky tod often painful, and it does not
usually happen except abac* there ie trust and nutual regard. Jourard
believes that faith and love are necessary conditions for people to
disclose themselves •*•** to cone to anew anotiter individual as a person.36
A->ri teajha oneself is tantamount in being oneself—to jaAni an into*
grated, '^hele, isoai&y pessoa.3?
Accordi^ to Jourard, a counselor or therapist suat be one «bo
knows biusatf and can be hiioelf, and ug Killing, as accessary, to
«., og. cit. , p. 23. ^JWg. *bid . , p. 185.
, see, for esaxple, pp. 30 and 14T. 27l^id»» P« 27.
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(Iterloan hioself , so that Ms client nay be alkie to do the sane. The
counselor (or anyone in the other healing professions, says Jourard)
oust have a genuine concern for his client, he open to hira, and be
one when the client can trust, so that self-disclosure nay ta&e place.
Many kinds of "tatting therapy," bn&lmim with Preud, are designed to
let the client reveal hineelf to another person, states Jourard, and
therein lies h?# hope of being healed. Healing occurs as the client
becones open to hinself, and can risk actually fating hineelf*
Ahrahna 'ftslow end w**a»« Decooine. Like fourard. Abrshaa m»«Um
"2J JC 2 ££ Emm aMJMMBM iZEHt * • W"^r™^"^»»»^ y * **a*^ ^^p^b^m • ^r^*T«w^w
is concerned about niilhtiillr being—"being one's true self* or becoming
oneself. Uaslow yould li&e to spell out a "psychology of health" to
criiplenent the psychology of sie&ness that Preud and others have
offered. 28
&4aslew*s theory of basic or instinctoid needs una discussed briefly
these built-in needs (For sustenance, safety, belongingness, love and
respect) renaia ungratified, the individual will be activated pri-
of basic need gratification "breeds illness," and causes people to
be neurotic, or otherwise sick.29 ttaslow conceives of psychological
noettt as eistilar to physiological nocirio for such <*»<»«* as iodine or
vitenin C. unless these needs are net. at least ntirinally, the person
retains deficient, unhealthy, or unwhol*. His behavior will be deter-
mined, in large neature , by the needs he feels are unfulfilled.
20-21.28to*lmt, Ibward a Psychology of Brian , pp. 3ff. ^bid. , pp.
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If the basic arads are satisfactorily net, the "inner nature*
of a person tmr then ewnpfae end begin to direct the person's life.
He will than be "growth activated," rather then deficiency activated,
and save toward "individuation, autonooy, aelf-ectualiaation, self-
developoeot, productivenesa, self-realisation.** which tern* are "all
crudely syaoavkaoas."30 Maslow admits that growth and self-actualiza-
tion and thcdr synenycis decimate a "vaguely perceived area rather
than a sharply defined concept, 03* But in Ms boos he shares his
exciteaeat over visat he sees as the emerging concern for a psychology
of health, or, as his title states, a "psychology of being."
Maslow writes more as a theorist and scientist than as a thera-
pist. Dut his thought has aany implications for those in the helping
professions. For instance, he states that "no psychological health
it possible unless this essential core of the person is fundamentally
accepted, loved M respected by Ml end by tdM.tf.-3> Mwlow
tries to provide the theoretical underpinnings for what many thera-
pists and counselors already know as to how they nay foster self-
acceptance and ~el£-actualization in their clients. And Maslow's
bread approach to the subject leaves roon for the theories of Freudians
and behaviorists, end of other social scientists, as well as the so-
called 'laird i'orcc psychologists that he draw- on so freely.
Health and the Ontolegical Question . The work of JourawS and1 n »m»mm .MM i ii nul l Mm i ll ii i i iiiii ' Mm in . i»
Maslow illustrates, to serae extent, the context within which nany
%bid., p. 22. 33lbid .
I,, p. 191 e
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psychologists are jjcappllne with the concepts of healing end health.
They freely use words such as "innes nature," "being," **becctting, tt
"estrangement" from onef s "real self,** "fait«f and "love, 4* 'nsuoan
potentialities,** and "self-actualization. ** though these men are
avowedly concerned about health as psychologists, it may be seen that
their concern transcends psychology as such, and that they are dealing
Kith metaphysical and etiological questions* The terminology is, in
part, philosophical, and cannot be otherwise, for to define health in
a comprehensive *»y is to deal with the question of human nature*
Perhaps the obvious query about psychologists such as Hatslow and
Jourard is, how good are they as philosophers? ?&at are their basic
assumptions?
Hollo May; Health and Being . Sella May, the one viio has raised
•MMMMMMM MM* . n il ) »! -.1 I n 1 i.ii i iiV *
the issue of the psychologist *s basic assumptions, himself deals frankly
with the entelogical questions inherent in the widerstanding of health
and healing. He speaks less about health as such than he does about
being. He states, for instance, that the "achieving of a sense of
being is a goal of all EUerapy,"33 so that the client may "experience
his eaustence as real."34
stay theorizes that "every existing person has thg character of
self-affirmation , cite need to preserve its ceaterednesa ."3 * Illness,i iii.i
-w 11 r ...»» 11 nm 1. mm. Bi i mm 11 1 ii.i m , .»..,. ., n *
e.g.. neurosis, is "precisely the method the individual uses to pre-
" 1 Ml 11 II ml- n i II 1 1 1 l i lil iilil »ii. 111 uumii.» i 11 1 —II 1 I » MWM* m. "im .ii.
serve his own center , his ojun existence . n3G Further, all persons have
*^Wy, Baisterice , p. 44. ^bid ., p. 85.
3%ay, Batstential ?qycnology» P. Tf. 36lbid., p. 76.
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"the need and the possibility of going out froa their ccateredaess to
participate in ojher L*ia^3 .n37 Shis "always involves rist!r"~the irisk
of losing oae f s eentereuaess ot identity, and inevitably entails
anxiety—ontoloGical anxiety in toe fAce of possible aen-~eittg. U&tal
health does not consist, then, of freedoa frost anxiety. Rather, tfce
objective and one of the purposes of therapy is to confront anxiety
constructively.•
Psychotherapy is conceived by Hay as an opportunity for two Dy-
sons to "encounter" each other, this requires all the skill and know-
ledge that the therapists training and experience can provide. But
it requires, also, the therapist's willingness to shore the world of
the client, to try to experience what the client is thinking and feel-
ing, and to risk hinself on behalf of the client. The encounter can
enable the client to cosae to tettia \&tu his world in oou way , to
increase his self-consciousness and dense of being* *** ** <*««** *aos^
effectively with his anxiety and guilt. "She goal of therapy is to
help the patient actualize his potentialities."^ No static defini-
tion of health is appropriate here. Zt oust, in the final analysis,
be defined by each person for himself in the context of fcisown world
33d hi? osa potentialities.
Carl Rogers 6«d the Role of Jig Waaler . Hie tverfc and thought of
- nin'i i' i »m n h i » ii i.i n wwK*. n iii.1 i »' '«.»»< .1 i n— m i .i
Carl Rogers hears sttntioninp here, for Rogers* theories in the area
•^Ibid,, p. 78. Italics in original.
38See also May , Psychology and the Hunan Dilessaa , p. 105
^bid., p. 109.
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of healing and health have grown out of his nany years of experience
as ft pavehotnerapiet. He was one of tfce first therapists t® let
others see ^fcst goes «iisa therapy tension tfurougu the use of film
and recordings. Sogers has shown a willingness to put fell Ideas to
the test, to discover, by empirical nenns, *&at aakos bealSag possible.
A taaaber of Rogers* nest significant writings have been collected
in s volans called oa Beconing a hereon . Which carves as a seed intro-
duction of Ms view of nan. tike %»ila liar, Rogers does x»st atteqpt
to define health as a state of being . Ha speaks, rather, of the
"capacity ami Hie tendency* latest if set evident* to neve forward
toward maturity. ***° He uses terms such as **growtb tendency,*1 "the
drive toward self-actusliaation," and the ^peecess of becoming" to
describe what he calls **the aainspring of life,*1 open *jfcich growth
end healing depend.4*
Sogers outlines bis concept of the **?ully fuactioniag,t (i.e.
,
healthy) person in a chapter called, ^3ne*apistf5 View of tfre Good
Life,**2 Such a person is open to his essperieace, and not defensive.
Be lives in tHe present, raster than the past or future* sad Sogers
calls tkLs "existential living •** TJ» fully faaetieaiaB person shews
naa increasing trust in his oggnttiaa," that is, in his mat judgments,
and in Ms ability to do what "feels right* in each existential situa-
tion. Ml a pstfsea enjoys a sense of psychic freedom, and can "sua"
and be responsible fee Ms feelings and behavior* He relates creatively
iMin km i ii n 1. m i
4(W*w» «&• 5&*» P* ^ 4albi4.> p. 3S end p. 55.
l» » PP* 103fx •
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It *iiiii eayisamwt, *au osa si&* issveetiug JhjjUf id close relation-
<ikii>s wi& otlassa. Vkt c&a ""<» tbftt self v&JLeU cac truly iu.n
ftfcjuflw^ jjgu wv-j.afcy. tfcstokii.912X9 sacra beslira. or "beluajan." rc2->»
tlca&j&3 # «ad tiie v&baae cite£ ?»exe sesacls&s Isis viesa cud sens of
tag r(ti:t'iesu £eS£££S& £i£S3i&&$« TfrffBlflfo h&2 WM& httS bee& S& ft ttognrvl >-.*: -
** ^fc^^^w^* ^•^•^•^^w w*4iyv Ww 9^vj^^^ wA^fttf4v^p*v *^4|9*** *^*e^j i^^^*-^«i^^^^B^ ^^•^^^•^^•wi^B^^j^^p •
fti#ir tt^i ottiv id tftst goes <ai is iisc therapist's «£T£ce# hut to all
1!* ffwwpift-t tee otiier Uel^ise pesm) ess essist 2a s&e growth
mod fcMMWI <** aao>£je* # ese/s kagesG, if t&e •ffiesa^ist can <i> tie hi»-
salf, taai Hi «k |MMl eatf teaaspssent, be Ma "seal feeling*/*
cad £2us Ixj trustm?&?f <20 waaly accept ex*d "seise* the other
pexsoa with "uneoaditieBfti positive tregasd;* aotf <3> sec the ether's
self ana Me Mosld s* be sees tlwu43 In these usys, the therapist
nay eseMf his eiieat to becoae e once fully fteictaqniag pessoau
XV« PSSCS12DCGV A?K> ISC 0CKCE7T OF VJ£$
A freief gestae e£ toe mask of £aae eaafceuswufajiy >>'5yt£ielesist3
CftflfcTd tfifci tHe <^vcdllJ5i ef Jiealtii is bs^ilv «n aie^wfei survey a£ ft
4-i^ui in ubicti &o may lwve i«4e Ijacjrt^it eauixi^uti^ts* Xet est
Hftslc*? etfegftste «beu he speeSoe ^ the T&it£ Zcxct, t£u»e ar^^s tacve
«»; swee to oe •is&tfic&st eveslft^Ui^s is tfte view of «M»e fiiesa^
ydats end other pspcfeoleeista, es the cssaples cite* eixwe lll»eteste.
4*lotd., p^« 3f»38.
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show may aiailarities in theory and practice, and they reveal
a desire to develop a psychology of the uholc oan. % their credit*
aost of these psychologists are open to new ideas, willing to accept
critically but gratefully the heritage of their predecessors, and are
agreed on the urgent need to put their theories to the test, both in
the laboratory, and in the therapist's office*
TO be sure, psychology has a Jong way to go. Like any science,
it nay not expect its final chapters to be written in the foreseeable
future, if ever. Nor can it be expected to settle the disputes
related to the question of nan utiles fall in the area of basic a.^usap-
tions that precede scientific investigation. Out aa Cordon Allport
hopes, psychology nay well be able to "reduce discord** arasnt the
several philosophies of man, if psychology itself does not claie to
have the final answers.
As long as science regains the servant of i»en, and is not allowed
to become their caster, there stay be hope that Allport* s vision id11
be at least partially realised, the psychologists referred to in this
report, for esaople, seen to have a great deal in coooon, even though
their philosophies of cam do not appear to be identical. But saore to
the point, a Christian view of oan, as herein presented, seems to be
at least newaiiHi t eonpatibie idth the theories of the third Force and
other psychologists discussed here, 'whether or not a psychologist's
outlook is called Christian, his psychology nay well be the neeting
place for both Christian and non-Christian views of ssan, if it is
acceptable to both. If psychologists can refrain fro© being dogmatic,
their varying transcendental conceptions aay not --tend in the way of
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recognising the partial truths of a great variety of approach**
to the study of nan.
IhcolocY and nycbologyt iSiere Do They Mae*?
To ctpell out the precise relationship between a Christian vietj
of nan and a particular psychology uould require a detailed study of
each instance to he examined. This vdll not be undertaken here, hut
it is vjorth noting that such studies have been do*ae, \dtti thooght-
pro^oling results. An interesting recent esasiple of this is found
in Ihctaas C. Qdeu*s boo!;, ^erygaa and Counseling. 44 the third of Oden*s
five chapters is entitled, ""Zfee Theology of Carl Sogers," in vhich the
author draw; ?,ooe provocative parallel;? betueen Christian concepts and
several categories of 'ioger thought.
Qdeu likens the concept of sin (or the human predicationt) to
Rogers* notion of "incongruence," tiaicb is defined as "a disjunction
between self and experience. ,l4s Galvation (i.e., the ravine or
Sealing event) is seen as simlar to the Hogerian idea of being uet
with unconditional positive regard by a congruent and aapothic person.46
And the now life in Christ is compared to Sogers* concept of the -.elf-
actualizing, fully functioning person.47
Oden takes care to point out the liiaitationr. of these analogies,
since Christian thought and Hogerr,* theories are not rinply tuo i£-
ferent statement of the same truths. But Oden*s intent is to show
^^ttoeas C. Odsn, Keryiaraa and Counseling (Ihiladelphia: The
: : :. ;\- re'JS, 1066) .
45Ibid
, ,
p. 91.
46Ibid .. p. 95. 47Xbid. , pp. 101f.
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that Rogers' client-centered therapy "eabodies a certain implicit
theological orientation," ami that Roisrsnis already a theologian of
sorts."48
Indeed, the thene of this paper is that every psychologist or
counselor is a "theologian of sorts. w It is because of this tiiat
.joychoiogists and counselors are urged to be aware o£ their basic
assumptions-- the transcendental conceptions that shape one*s illicit
theology, and find e;;,-ce33.L:m in the healing UOri zlsxt the therapist
or councelor tries to undertoize. Tiq scientist or the professional
healer will he truer to oinself , and do greater justice to his calling,
to the extent that he lets his underlying philosophy he esQ>licit, so
that it way give shape end Meaning to the ta&ivS to which he eertiits
hii»el£.
The Christian and the Sealing Process
I .'« Hi » « : II ! ! » llll » l< » l I I » « l » « IIH« I I > llllf «MtWMH>
.'.1though there is a place for preaching one's beliefs in the coe-
siuaity of aen, Gden*s fcooi: is not an effort to convince Carl Sogers or
anyone else that they should he a Christian. Qden points out, rather,
that the Christian uoy find the ei^odiaent of this theology in the
theories and nethods of a psychotherapist such as Rogers. This nay
or nay not concern Rogers MMNflftf • whose implicit theology could
conccivahly he thoroughly humanistic in his own iiind. Out if that is
the case, the worh of P*ogers is but one example of the way various
theologies and philosophies of tisn overlap, at least in Western culture.
It has been shown that a nuuher of psychologists present theories
toXbid., p. 03.
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that are of interest to the avowed Christian. One any look in vain
for a so-called Christian psychology , for nc systematic science of
the psyche is available that Christians could agree on in every
respect. Out the Christian nay find expression of his basic assunp-
tions in the theories of a great aany psychologists, uaose work nay
be in accord vrith Christian beliefs. As a psychologist or therapist
.
the Christian need cot he concerned udtli tsfoether his professional
colleagues share his basic viewpoint, lie may rather rejoice in that
he chares nany concerns with his associates, can learn nuch frorc then,
cod join with then in the continuing search for truth.
'Ihe Christian does approach the Question of healing and health
tsitfc certain prejiKlice, hcssevei', and he night as well adult it.
2hie prejudice or basic belief has to do with the nature of reality,
in s&ich the Christian finds the egression of God9s love and healing
purpose. Odea states this belief in his final chapter when a says,
Our thesis lias be&x that effective secular psydtotherapy
iEgplicitly nmM an accepting reality i£iich is nade
explicit in the Christian kerygaa.49
"Therapy" for the "psyche** is precisely what the Gospel is all
about, Oden states. Inether therapy or healing is conceived of in
Christian terns, the person seeking it
.
hopes that healing is a possi-
bility, and the therapist asswaes that it is. Those who see the Christ
as the fulfillment of laxm hopes , and the incarnation of Cod's healing
and saving potior, arc bound to see in any act of healing, tfie reality of
4%bid.
,
p. 146. She word, kerygna <fron the Greel:), refers to the
pcoclamtion of the Gospel uessage.
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Ocd#s leva U3 rev. in the Cftrist.
Use Christian^ concern as c Christian , therefore, is to pro-
clain au act of Sealing for what it is—1bfi evidence of Godfs saving
;jurpose M i3K«»-n through t&e Christ. The tijera^ist or other ijealer
nay be seen as KM nediator of the divine healing power that fli
available to all aen.
This is not, however, i call for CSiristinn polenica. It is, father,
SB invitation to those engaged in Iieaiiiig to relate their ir%4icit
assumptions to the explicit preclaiaition of the Good News. It £6 also
sax invitation to those wSto have experienced healing to rejoice i« the
cossdc significance of their feUflg received and nade whole fcy the New
Deiau in Christ, ?&u cones to restore and to heal, that which is estranged.
Suhmutv
This discussion of health and the neans of achieving it clearly
indicates that these issues regain highly dchatahle. A I jical
approach to these questions suggests, in Christian terns, that Jesus
the Christ is the criterion and the source of ail healing. Presto*
ably, the Qaristiaa speaks out of his experience as one who has been
MMMfl and pads whale by God in Christ. LUseuUe, the psychologist
or counselor aay s;xja»i out of his experience as one who has studied
ead engaged in the healing process, and seen people oecooe snore Jaealthy.
Thou$i the descriptions of healing and health may vary widely,
there is general agreement that healing can and does take place.
$& those in the healing professions, the need for clarifying basic
and for greater research in the area of healing and health
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is apparent. The Christian agrees with this, and gladly joins in
the ongoing quest for truth. But the Christian brings to his work
as healer or scientist his faith that the healing already seen in
the lives of estranged laen—however it is described—is further
evidence of the saving purpose of God in Christ*
CHftiSSR V
Poftlovdns the plea of loUo .'lay and others that :>sychologi3ts
sat! counselor3 oust be a/are of the basic assumptions tfiai define
their goals and underlie scientific study, this report is a discus-
sion of sam questions about the nature of wan. The eoutent of the
questions was suggested by a scene frou T. 3. Biiot 9s play, She
Cocktail I'arty , -iiiich provides a view of ton's condition in tens*
of tee Christian faith. The theology of oul Tiliich was used as
t!« frmsMSfte for this discussion, because of the coiiereace of ills
understanding of Christian beliefs, and because his existentialist
lancuace offered a bridge between his theological views and the thought
of iiany psycholoGists.
In particular, Eillich's notion of the hunon prediennent, tiiich is
experienced as sin or estranoesacnt, yas regarded as especially helpful.
Pes an esaoinaticn of the work of sows contemporary psychologists
sirjocsted that the bunan predicament is what they, too, are trying to
describe and understand, find estrancesaent, a word that s»« therapists
also use, appeared to be v&at those iJho see!: therapy are, -In fact,
HWstlinc with.
It was fisrtl*er pointed out that psychologists and counselors also
used a concept of fee healthy or \&ole ran, and an understanding of the
process, in terns of their fcasie assumptions. 1\> this ond t a
84
Christian flow of fwumfw/ and health mm lemioHil as one HT*f of
ouch tiimriliwiHI concetJts. Current theories of health in psycho-
logical teem wot* than soanarlaed, aid the views of four psycholo-
gists on healing and health were reviewed, because they issnort largely
to Christian concepts. Finally, a specific instance of relating Christian
tbeoloev to the thought of a practician rayfhatherspAst was briefly
c;i&:-z£j:iz<&l , r.ii«:u rtsTerCi.ee to Thorias Odci's essay of the theology of
Carl Sogers.
It seens quite likely that aaca questions acre raiser! in &&&
report than wore sett&sd* -3B?ae questions fiat tea been in^Hed will
3* seatioocd here as yossioilitioa for further ospiosatioa and study.
essentially evil or anod. Bhe «*«»aan» to this involved Question de—^pp»jpr»jpT»jpjipji^p^p>Pilp^p^^^* ^F »^"™^** ^p"^w jr^F^"^*r*J ^^^^p^p ^jpa^PWF^w^^^Pr ^r ^p^ ^^w^^pp^f «^^^» v ^p-»»» w ^p>^^ -*^^pppp>^r -w bpf^f^ppi ^^»^p?
evil entails soring value Jtsdnsnts, based on one's fuadanental beliefs,
"Jiicli will not ue arr*uetl here. ISm txirwsc of roisinr this ouestioa•••'•WW WPWP^^ •PPPF' PF P^^V ^^PPp^^F^P^FP^ ^^^P^P^F ^P» PJ •^^^^p* |P/"^PJP^P,J^"^P/^PJ^P^ ^^p^"- ^^ •• ™ •" ^""^PJ^k w»^^^"^» ^j^^^p^^-^pr ^r ^^-^—^~»
is, rather, to pugftit aone of its implication for psychologists and
counselors. Bar if son t9 regarded as goosl, ho is apt to be treated
differently than if ha is considered primarily as evil*
•
'.
It is. norhans. the influence of Tttritanisia in Aoerican culture
that has fostered the inplicit assusption of non*a basically evil
nan, Tillich has stated that theology also •Vsast osfteaiae the positive
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valuation of am in bis essential nature,*' ind guard against denials
of **aa*»s created goodness."1
A neater of laird Force psychologists seen to favor a seaewhat
optinistic view of nan. Maslow, fee instance, has written that
saw's "inner nature"
net to he intrinsically evil, hut rather neutral or
positively good. Ubat we call evil behavior appears neat
often to he secondary reaction to frustration of this
intrinsic nature.'2
i)aslo\/9s t nnniBfrr is father guarded here, hut these two sentences
are nest f—'gft*, I'TiTf***1^ undoubtedly one thing that Maslow has in
sdnd is the change that can taise place in people who enter therapy,
or who are otherwise helped or "cured.'* Behavior usually colled
evil—destruetiveaess, hatred, defensiveness, et aJU—osy give way to
"acceptable*' actions, such as concern for others, affection, and
i, which are aore apt to he called good. If these changes are
regarded as "uncovering" nan's inner nature, as Maslow and others
suggest, then it is reasonable to say that nan is not intrinsically
evil.
Ac was discussed in Chapter XV above, being one's true self has
been defined as the goal of the growing and healing process. Shis
clearly inpliee that being oneself is a good thing. Bat it should be
noted that the concept of real-self-being is a difficult one for those
who would define good behavior in terns of suppressing "evil" impulses
end covering up the "beast"in nan. Ihis latter view aeee nan as
1£illich. Systematic iheology . H, 38.
;Wa*nw. Jgggd a&**&**&** P- 3
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basically bad, and regards real-self-being as something to be avoided,
for the sake of nan and society. It is at this point that sone of the
Third Force psychologists challenge what may be the prevailing view of
man in thi3 culture, and force Christians to take anotlier look at the
implications of their traditional concept of sin.
Yet it is the emphasis placed on the fundamental acceptance of
the individual as he really is that nay give Christians pause to
consider what Maslow, Rogers, Jourard, and other psychologists are
saying. Bach of these men states clearly that being oneself is pos-
sible only in the face of unconditional positive regard, as Rogers
has defined it. Being accepted, and accepting one's acceptance, are
what enables a person to feel less threatened by others, and to
lessen his anger or defensiveness as neans of protecting himself.
The therapists invitation to his client to be hinself is not a call
for unrestricted expression of negative feelings (though some expres-
sion of feelings may be expected), but rather the attempt to convey
to the client that he is prized and warmly regarded, even though sone
of his impulses or behavior are "unacceptable. " Vflien he knows he is
accepted, a person is able to deal more creatively with his feelings,
and change his behavior. It is in this context of acceptance and
positive regard that being one*s true self may be held as a good thing.
None of this is to say, however, that man can avoid evil. Maslow*s
idea that 'HAiat we call evil behavior appears most often to be a
secondary reaction to frustration of this intrinsic nature" bears
further thought and study. But Maslow himself suggests that the frus-
tration of man's inner nature seems inevitable. Man, in other wrds,
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cannot escape Ma instinct©id needs, his limitations, or any of the
other conditions of estrangement into which be ia horn, no natter how
the conditions may be conceptualised. Moreover, *wn fs need for love
and acceptance indicates his interdependence with other men, and his
inability to save or heal himself . As has already been discussed*
t'uone coiicc;>t3 flgaj close aajajaJBMl tl Hal Christian ;iotiori3 ar cin
and healing. For the Christian, evil may be seen most clearly in nan's
refusal to accept responsibility for his own estrangement, and in his
self-centered attempts *© save himself . Ibis context for the defini-
tion of good and evil any give added weaning t© the discussion of this
question as it is raised by some of the Third Perce psychologists.
At one point, Haslow speaks of man's inner nature as "prior to
fend end evil.**3 this interesting consent is reminiscent of the
Biblical notion of nan's original innocence before the Fall. And it
serves as a reminder that the concepts of good and evil entail making
a conscious choice between alternatives, and nance the actualization
of nan's freedom, the Idea that nan is totally determined tfy forces
beyond his control is rejected by Maslow, and, of course, by Chris-
evil, lie loses his innocence as soon as he ma&es a choice, and thus
realises his "finite" freedon. In this sense, every man "falls" from
innocence, which is his state before choosing, and is "prior to good
and evil."*
^bid.. p. 181.
45ee Tilliehvs discussion of the meaning of the Fall, og. cit .,
XX , 29-39. He refers to the Pall as "the transition from essence to
existence."
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.3ku jg ltova .latarc? J* difficulty of defining Isswi nature**
is m$>Xy illustrated iu the previous question. hat does it nean to
speak of hunan nature, or of nuau9s intrinsic nature?'*
Tillich points out that
nature can nean nsn*s essential or created nature}
it can dean naa*s existential or estranged nature; and
other twov^
Shis is a question which is not adequately dealt with by the
psychologists referred to in this report, Vhen Maslow, for instance,
is theorizing about huraan needs, he is dealing -j»ith vm as he exists,
and with sooe of the conditions of his estrangenent. But he also
speaks of aaa*s "intrinsic" nature, end thus clearly holies that
nan has what Tl.ll.ich calls an •'essential or created nature.** Concepts
such as nseif-actualisationM or "TeaX-self-being" suggest that it is
nan*s essential nature that is to be actualized, and is the basis for
a definition of health.
Again, this oay be primarily a question of defining and being
aware of onefs basic assumptions, the Christian assuoes that it is
in Jesus the Christ that one aay see the "essential" Man. Other
definitions of "intrinsic** or essential ran are possible, and these
nay be quite different. Hut in any case, 000*8 view of essential nan
renains in the renin of basic assumptions, and is only aero or loss
actualized in the lives of existing nan.* In the words of Tillich,
it is the "sHfeiguous unity" of the two natures of nan that is seen
5Ibid., p. 147. *&Jaslow, ojg. cit., pp. lOoff.
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in the therapists consulting rooo sad spelled out ir the psychologists
theories. There are no persons who are fully healed or celf-actualired,
so that a definition of essential una can only he inferred frost litiited
evidence provided by nan living in estrangement. Tillich*s distinctions
concerning husaan nature are useful, however, for they are necessary in
order to define and understand uan, both as he is axistentially, and as
he say becoue as he saves toward greater health and self-actualization.
SBtt j&MM&M2& <>y»e^? A final mji* questic* only
hinted at in this report has to do with the role of the counselor or
therapist as spelled out in tenaa of his basic assumptions. In its
practical di*.iansiou, this is the question of nethodolocy—the techniques
and know-how that aay be required for one who is involved in the healing
process. Dut in its theoretical dinension, this is a question of stating
the goals and objectives the therapist say have as healer.
One tuny of defining the role of the counselor in the language of
this report is as follows: the healer is called to help estranged nan
becene what he essentially is. Ibis broad definition uay be applied
to any of the healing arts, as well as to other relationships test
exist in the society of oen. Dut to say that the therapist or coun-
selor should assist his clients to becont what they essentially are is
sorely to beg all of the questions discussed in this paper, and aiore.
Per in order to put neat on such a skeletal statement of the couuselor*s
role, the counselor wust be able to understand and accept that client
as he is, to assess the clients and his own resources for healing, and
have seen idea of what it ueans to saove toward increased health or
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essentiality. It vjrs to Assist counselors interested in a Christian
view of oan to outline the basic assumptions needed to define their
role that this paper was written*
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What is the nature of the human condition? Does the religious
concept of sin add to an understanding of man's predicament? How
can the notions of healing and health be usefully defined? These
questions outline the problem discussed in this paper, which is a
study of some basic assumptions about the nature of man. The ques-
tions are of primary importance of psychologists and counselors, for
it is their presuppositions concerning man that underlie empirical
research, and define the goals of psychotherapy.
Since one's concept of human nature is based on preconceptions
or beliefs, a fundamental point of view is necessary in order to dis-
cuss man. The author draws upon his Christian faith to supply the
basic viewpoint, and raises the question of man initially in the con-
text of T. S. Eliot's play, The Cocktail Party , which is an expression
of the playwright's Christian beliefs. The writings of Paul Tillich
are used to provide a specific theological framework for the presenta-
tion of a Christian perspective on man.
Tillich offers new insights into the meaning of sin, which he calls
the human predicament. His helpful synonym for sin is estrangement, a
word that is given significance by existentialist approach to theology
is useful, both in clarifying Christian concepts, and in providing a
means of comparing the Christian position with the basic assumptions
of a number of contemporary psychologists.
Tillich describes the human predicament in terms of individual
freedom and universal destiny—the polar conditions, so to speak,
2within which man exists. Some of the so-called "Third Force" psycho-
logies referred to by Abraham Maslow are examined in the light of
tiiis understanding of man's predicament. Bach is seen to describe
certain aspects of the "elements of destiny," which Tillich defines
as the factors which condition man's freedom. For instance, Sidney
Jourard's concern with the roles that men play, and Maslow"s theory
of human instinctoid needs, both illustrate the so-called elements
of destiny that affect man's life. But insofar as these psycholo-
gists speak of human self-actualization and autonomy, they allow
room for the concept of sin, which entails, as well, nan's finite
freedom and personal responsibility as part of his predicament.
The ways in which psychologists' and counselors* tss tnptions
about man affect their notions of healing and health are discussed
in Chapter IV. A Christian view of health is first outline <j, based
on Tillich's appraisal of Jesus the Christ as the source and the
criterion of human well-being. Current concepts of mental health
are reviewed, following which the ideas of Jourard, Maslow, Rollo
May, and Carl Rogers are examined as possible fruitful ways of
understanding health in psychological terms. Rolla May, especially,
shows that health is basically an ontological question, and he sug-
gests that the goal of psychotherapy is to increase the sense of being
in the client. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the theology
of Carl Rogers, which is an example of ways in which the basic assump-
tions of psychology and Christian theology may actually meet and over-
lap.
This report leaves many questions unanswered, some of which are
suggested in the final chapter. Is man good or evil? What is human
nature? "hat is the counselor's role? It is questions such as these,
and their many implications, that led to the writing of this study,
so that counselors and psychologists might be aware of how their
fundamental presuppositions affect their work, and consider them
from a religious point of view.


